JFTA-Bench: Evaluate LLM's Ability of Tracking and Analyzing Malfunctions Using Fault Trees

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Abstract

In the maintenance of complex systems, fault trees are used to locate problems and provide targeted solutions. To enable fault trees stored as images to be directly processed by large language models, which can assist in tracking and analyzing malfunctions, we propose a novel textual representation of fault trees. Building on it, we construct a benchmark for multi-turn dialogue systems that emphasizes robust interaction in complex environments, evaluating a model's ability to assist in malfunction localization, which contains 3130 entries and 40.75 turns per entry on average. We train an end-to-end model to generate vague information to reflect user behavior and introduce long-range rollback and recovery procedures to simulate user error scenarios, enabling assessment of a model's integrated capabilities in task tracking and error recovery, and Gemini 2.5 pro achieves the best performance.

1 Introduction

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive failure analysis methodology that has been widely adopted in the maintenance of complex systems for fault localization and decision support (Lee et al., 2009). Starting from a predefined system-level top event, FTA models the causal relationships between failures using Boolean logic and progressively decomposes system failures into basic events such as component-level malfunctions (Ruijters and Stoelinga, 2015). Subsequent extensions, including Dynamic Fault Trees (Čepin and Mavko, 2002), further enrich the expressive power of fault trees by introducing additional logic gates and temporal dependencies, enabling more fine-grained reasoning in realistic industrial scenarios.

In parallel, large language models (LLMs), represented by systems such as GPT-5 (Singh et al., 2025), Gemini 3 pro (Gemini Team, Google, 2025) and DeepSeek-V3.2 (DeepSeek-AI, 2025), have achieved rapid advances in recent years. With strong capabilities in in-context learning (Dong et al., 2024), recent research on LLM-based agents (Luo et al., 2025) further highlights their applicability in complex decision-making and interactive problem-solving tasks, suggesting promising opportunities for assisting fault tree–based diagnosis. To support both professional technicians and non-expert users in efficiently locating malfunctions in complex systems without requiring manual exploration of extensive fault trees, we leverage LLMs to assist and streamline the diagnosis workflow.

However, existing fault tree standards and datasets are predominantly image-based (Vesely et al., 1981), whereas most open-source and commercial LLMs are pretrained primarily on textual corpora (Zhao et al., 2026). Although multimodal models attempt to bridge this gap by projecting visual features into textual embedding spaces via connector-based alignment (Liu et al., 2023b), such approaches inevitably introduce information loss and limit precise structural reasoning (Feng et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2023a).

To address this mismatch, we propose JFTA (JSON-based Fault Tree Analysis), a structured, extensible, and model-friendly textual representation of fault trees. By organizing different logic gates through explicit structural compositions and enabling cross-branch references, our representation supports faithful textual encoding of complex fault trees beyond simple tree structures. It strikes a balance between natural language expressiveness and formal structural rigor.

Building on this representation, we construct a benchmark to evaluate the ability of LLMs to learn and reason over fault trees. Figure 1 provides an overview of the JFTA-Bench construction and evaluation pipeline. We collect and process a Chinese-

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


Figure 1: The left panel illustrates the Human-in-the-loop data collection process. The middle panel depicts the path sampling procedure capable of handling DAG structures. The right panel demonstrates the multi-turn evaluation framework featuring user rollback scenarios.

language dataset of 126 fault trees from diverse domains, with an average of 140 nodes per tree. From these fault trees, we sample 3,130 distinct fault path groups and organize them into multiple difficulty levels. To further approximate real-world conditions, we explicitly model user errors during interaction. We introduce long-range state rollback and recovery procedures, where users may correct or revise earlier statements in the dialogue history. This design enables systematic evaluation of a model's integrated capabilities in task tracking, consistency maintenance, and error recovery across extended multi-turn conversations.

The benchmark evaluates whether a model can correctly localize all root causes and propose appropriate solutions within a limited number of interaction turns. According to our evaluation, Gemini 2.5 pro (Comanici et al., 2025a) achieves the best overall performance, successfully passing 53.76% of the test cases by correctly identifying all malfunctions. Among open-source models, DeepSeek-V3.2 performs the strongest, reaching a success rate of 41.40%. Further analysis indicates that model failures are primarily attributable to deficiencies in planning capability.

To simulate realistic and consistent user behavior in complex interactive settings, we select 100 fault trees from the dataset to train a user simulator that supports multi-turn dialogue evaluation. The trained user generates vague, uncertain, and occasionally biased information, better reflecting real user characteristics and potential adversarial behaviors. The remaining 26 fault trees are used for testing, on which the user simulator achieves a correctness rate of 99.98%.

In summary, our contributions are threefold:

- We propose JFTA, a structured, extensible, and easy-to-understand textual representation for fault trees.
- We construct JFTA-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating fault localization and error recovery capabilities of LLMs in multi-turn dialogue settings.
- We train a user simulator that generates vague, uncertain, and biased responses to support realistic multi-turn interaction evaluation.

2 Related Work

2.1 Fault Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was originally introduced by Bell Laboratories in 1962 as a qualitative design aid for system reliability analysis (Ruijters and Stoelinga, 2015). It was later adopted and formalized by Boeing in the aerospace industry (Eckberg, 1963), where it evolved into a practical analytical and computational tool for diagnosing and maintaining complex engineered systems (Ericson and Ll, 1999). Since then, FTA has been widely applied across safety-critical domains such as aviation (Goldberg et al., 1994), chemical process (of Chemical Engineers. Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1985), and so on. Classical FTA represents causal relationships between failures using Boolean logic, primarily through AND and OR gates, and decomposes a predefined system-level top event into basic events corresponding to component-level failures (Vesely et al., 1981). Dynamic Fault Trees (Čepin and Mavko, 2002) introduce additional logic gates and temporal dependencies, and the International Electrotechnical Commission established the IEC 61025 standard (Committee et al., 2006), which defines FTA as a globally accepted formalism for reliability and safety analysis.

2.2 Evaluation of Multi-Turn Dialogue Systems

Existing research commonly categorizes dialogue systems into task-oriented dialogue (TOD) systems and open-domain dialogue (ODD) systems (Wang et al., 2025). Our work can be viewed as an extension of TOD evaluation into the domain of fault tree–based diagnosis, which exhibits inherently multi-turn, highly structured, and domain-specific characteristics. For TOD systems, a number of widely adopted benchmarks have been proposed, including general-purpose datasets such as MultiWOZ (Budzianowski et al., 2020) and CrossWOZ (Zhu et al., 2020), as well as domain-specific benchmarks such as KddRES (Wang et al., 2020), Transfer-TOD (Zhang et al., 2024), and PFDial (Zhang et al., 2025). Compared with existing multi-turn evaluation efforts, such as MT-Eval (Kwan et al., 2024), which evaluates dialogue performance across four domains but with relatively short interaction lengths, or MT-Bench-101 (Bai et al., 2024), which further introduces a hierarchical evaluation framework for multi-turn dialogue, our benchmark emphasizes long-horizon interactions involving complex reasoning over structured fault trees, and additionally incorporates a trained user simulator to generate realistic and imperfect user behaviors.

2.3 Evaluation of Agent Capabilities

Recent studies on LLM-based agents have proposed a variety of benchmarks that emphasize multi-step reasoning, tool use, memory, and self-reflection capabilities (Yehudai et al., 2025). For example, τ-Bench (Yao et al., 2024) evaluates an agent's ability to simulate customer service interactions in aviation and retail domains, while CRMArena (Huang et al., 2025) assesses agent performance in customer relationship management scenarios that require executing multi-step operations under domain-specific policies. MINT (Wang et al., 2023) evaluates planning capabilities in interactive environments, focusing on how agents adapt their strategies based on environmental feedback. In many agent benchmarks, tools are treated as interfaces with parameterized actions in uncertain environments (Patil et al., 2025). In contrast, fault trees define a set of valid structural states in advance, and the corresponding remediation actions can be determined once the underlying failures are correctly identified. Consequently, our work places less emphasis on tool-use ability.

3 The JFTA Representation

Existing fault tree representations are predominantly diagrammatic or semi-formal, typically distributed as static images (Vesely et al., 1981). While effective for human interpretation, such formats are less suited for direct processing by large language models (Tang et al., 2025). To bridge this gap, we propose a structured textual syntax based on JSON, termed JFTA. JFTA preserves the core deductive logic of FTA while providing a formal, parseable, and extensible format, and strikes a balance between natural language expressiveness and formal structural rigor. On one hand, node names and solution descriptions are presented in natural language, facilitating semantic understanding. On the other hand, the underlying architecture enforces strict syntactic and logical constraints, supporting programmatic verification. We provide detailed information and example of JFTA in Appendix A.

3.1 Syntax Definition

In JFTA, a fault tree is defined as a rooted structure that can represent a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). Each node constitutes a semantic unit relevant to the fault, representing a different-level event, or a logic gate. JFTA supports a flexible set of logical and semantic nodes.

Logic Gate Nodes: These nodes formally describe the causal relationships between parent and child events. JFTA incorporates standard Boolean operators, including AND, OR, and XOR gates, to model common failure modes. The syntax is highly extensible, allowing for the integration of additional logic gates through custom definitions.

Semantic Nodes: These nodes distinguish between intermediate states that require further decomposition and terminal nodes that represent the end of the analysis. Specifically, intermediate nodes represent fault states that must be further analyzed, while leaf nodes are designated as solution nodes, containing natural language descriptions of specific repair actions or operational procedures.

3.2 Hierarchical Structure and References

The hierarchy between nodes is primarily expressed through a recursive nested structure, where a parent node contains a list of child nodes. However, complex systems often exhibit shared failure modes where a single subsystem failure contributes to multiple higher-level events. To avoid redundancy and explosion in tree size, JFTA introduces an explicit linking mechanism. Nodes can reference previously defined nodes via their unique IDs. This transforms the representation from a strict tree into a DAG, enhancing compactness and maintainability while preserving semantic consistency.

4 JFTA-Bench

To evaluate the capacity LLMs to reason over fault trees via in-context learning, we construct JFTA-Bench. Built upon the JFTA syntax defined in Section 3, this benchmark assesses a model's ability to assist users in malfunction localization within multi-turn dialogue settings. It emphasizes understanding complex context, strategic planning, and maintaining robust interaction in dynamic environments.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the JFTA-Bench construction and evaluation pipeline. The left part illustrates the fault tree collection process. The middle part shows how fault paths are extracted from fault trees in a bottom-up manner, capturing valid combinations of failures under complex logic gates. The right part depicts the interaction framework, where a simulated user engages with the LLM assistant under test, including scenarios with long-range state rollback and recovery.

Formal Definition We formalize each JFTA-Bench instance as :

$$x = (G, \mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{P}_1, \pi_1, \mathcal{F}_2, \mathcal{P}_2, \pi_2, \rho).$$

G is a JFTA-formatted fault tree. For $k \in \{1, 2\}$, $\mathcal{F}_k$ denotes the set of ground-truth bottom-level faults, $\mathcal{P}_k$ is the corresponding set of root-to-fault paths, and π_k is the ideal DFS-style traversal path induced by $\mathcal{P}_k$. The first group $(\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{P}_1, \pi_1)$ defines the initial diagnostic state, while the second group $(\mathcal{F}_2, \mathcal{P}_2, \pi_2)$ defines the corrected state after rollback.

$\rho = (v_{\text{trig}}, v_{\text{corr}})$ is defined as the rollback setting , where v_{trig} is the rollback trigger node on the first traversal path π_1. When the interaction reaches v_{trig}, the user switches from the first fault setting to the second one. Let $\text{LCP}(\pi_1, \pi_2)$ denote the longest common prefix of π_1 and π_2. The corrected-observation node v_{corr} is defined as the last node of this prefix:$v_{\text{corr}} = \text{Last}\big(\text{LCP}(\pi_1, \pi_2)\big)$. It satisfies either $v_{\text{corr}} \in V(\mathcal{P}_1) \setminus V(\mathcal{P}_2)$ or $v_{\text{corr}} \in V(\mathcal{P}_2) \setminus V(\mathcal{P}_1)$ where $V(\mathcal{P}_k) = \bigcup_{p \in \mathcal{P}_k} p$, indicating that its observation must be revised after rollback.

At each turn t, the assistant receives the fault tree and the dialogue history $H_{<t}$, and outputs either a fault query or a solution proposal. The user simulator receives the fault tree, the active path set $\mathcal{P}_k$, and the assistant action, where $k = 1$ before rollback and $k = 2$ after rollback. Let $\widehat{\mathcal{F}}$ be the set of fault nodes whose solutions are finally confirmed as effective. The instance is considered successful iff $\widehat{\mathcal{F}} = \mathcal{F}_2$.

4.1 Fault Tree Collection

We first identified 24 domains requiring the maintenance of complex systems, such as Power & Energy, Aerospace. Within these domains, we defined 126 specific failure scenarios (see Appendix B.1 for the full list).

To construct the dataset, we employed a human-in-the-loop generation pipeline. First, human experts manually annotated high-quality fault trees for three representative scenarios using strict JFTA

Level	Size	Assistant Prompt Length	User Prompt Length	Interaction Turns	Error Count
1	1103	5935.04	1096.87	20.17	1.50
2	1116	5924.64	1218.17	42.91	3.49
3	911	5939.75	1395.38	63.05	6.29

Table 1: Statistics of JFTA-Bench

syntax. These served as seed examples. Subsequently, we utilized GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024) and Claude Sonnet 4.5 (Anthropic, 2025) in a One-Shot setting. By providing the complete JFTA syntax definition and the expert-annotated examples, we prompted the LLMs to generate fault trees for the remaining scenarios. The generated trees underwent rigorous review by human experts to ensure logical correctness and adherence to structural constraints, resulting in our final set of 126 verified fault trees.

4.2 Path Extraction and Dataset Construction

JFTA supports extensible logic gates and cross-branch references. Consequently, path sampling requires specific traversal logic. For instance, if a path traverses an AND gate, all child nodes of that gate must be included in the fault path. We extracted paths via a bottom-up approach, starting from sets of 1 to 6 initial basic failures. Using Algorithm 1, we extended these failures upward to the root event. We classify test cases into three difficulty levels according to the number of final underlying failures after expansion: Level 1 for 1–2 failures, Level 2 for 3–4 failures, and Level 3 for 5 or more failures.

4.3 Error Simulation and Recovery

Real-world users often make observation errors and need to correct prior statements. To evaluate the model's robustness against such volatility, we introduced long-range state rollback and recovery scenarios. This setup tests whether the model can accurately backtrack within the dialogue history, update its internal belief state, and proceed with the correct fault diagnosis based on the revised information.

4.4 Interaction Framework

We adopt the ReAct framework (Yao et al., 2022) for the evaluation. The model under test functions as an assistant interacting with a simulated User. In each turn, the assistant can either ask the user to verify the occurrence of a specific fault node or propose a solution for a confirmed failure. The user responds to the assistant's inquiries or confirms whether a proposed solution is effective.

To mimic the complexity of real-world diagnostics, user responses are not binary (True/False). Instead, the user provides vague or context-dependent descriptions based on the observation from environments or vague description, requiring the assistant to parse and infer the actual fault status. To achieve this, we trained a specialized user simulator capable of generating ambiguous yet consistent responses, detailed in Section 5.

4.5 Dataset Statistics

Our dataset is derived from 126 complex fault trees, averaging 140 nodes per tree. We sampled 3130 entries, where each entry contains two distinct paths to support the error recovery evaluation. On average, each session requires 40.75 interaction turns to resolve. To support the ReAct interaction, we designed specific system prompts for both the user and assistant (see Appendix F.2 and F.1). The objective is for the model, acting as an assistant, to start from an observed top-level symptom and progressively localize all faults and provide solutions within limited turns. Table 1 summarizes the key statistics of JFTA-Bench. The prompt length is calculated by the Qwen3-8B (Yang et al., 2025) tokenizer.

5 User Simulator Training

We trained a user simulator based on Qwen3-8B to simulate realistic user behaviors, including providing ambiguous feedback and maintaining consistency. The training pipeline consists of two stages: Supervised Fine-Tuning for behavior cloning and Reinforcement Learning for response optimization.

5.1 Data Collection and Construction.

We utilized the 126 fault trees collected in Section 4.1, partitioning them into a training set (100 trees) and a testing set (26 trees). For each fault tree , we constructed training samples by iterating

through all possible fault nodes or solution nodes. We generated potential user responses (Accept or Reject) and sampled corresponding path sets where paths either include or exclude consistent with the response.

To improve model robustness and prevent hacking behaviors (e.g., the user leaking the entire fault path or list of failures), we augmented the dataset with negative samples. We simulated invalid assistant requests, for instance, asking for unresolved faults, querying multiple faults simultaneously, or requesting irrelevant information, and paired them with rejection responses.

We employed an ensemble of advanced LLMs, including Gemini 2.5 flash (Comanici et al., 2025b), GPT-4o, and Claude Sonnet 4.5 randomly to synthesize dialogue data via One-Shot learning. Specialized prompts were designed to encourage vague expressions, mimicking non-expert users, which is shown in Appendix F.3. The target output was formatted in JSON, containing:

`action`: Classification of the assistant's intent.

`name`: The specific fault or solution queried.

`return`: The logical feedback (Accept/Reject).

`response`: The natural language response, specifically stylized to be ambiguous.

Detailed statistics of the collected user simulation dataset are provided in Appendix C.1.

5.2 Behavior Cloning

We first fine-tuned the Qwen3-8B model using the LLaMA-Factory (Zheng et al., 2024) framework on the collected dataset to obtain the behavior-cloned model, U_{bc}. Training was conducted on 16 NVIDIA H20 GPUs for 4 hours. Detailed hyperparameters are provided in the Appendix E.1.

5.3 Response Optimization

Inspired by recent work in rule-based reinforcement learning (Guo et al., 2025), we further optimized U_{bc} using the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm (Schulman et al., 2017) to improve adherence to the requirements of vagueness and the format constraints. We defined a hybrid reward function as follows:

- r_{format}: A positive reward is granted if the model output strictly follows the required JSON schema.
- $r_{correctness}$: If the format is valid, we compare the generated fields (`action`, `name`, `return`) with the ground truth.

We utilized the veRL framework (Sheng et al., 2024) for PPO training. The training was conducted on a cluster of 8 H20 GPUs. The PPO optimization process required approximately 8 hours to complete. Specific RL hyperparameters are listed in the Appendix E.2.

5.4 User Simulator Evaluation

To investigate the performance differences between reinforcement learning strategies, we additionally implemented the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm (Shao et al., 2024) with a group size of $N = 4$.

We evaluate the trained user simulator from both functional correctness and behavioral realism perspectives. Correctness is measured in a strict, deterministic manner: a generated response is considered correct only when its `action`, `name`, and `return` fields exactly match the ground-truth annotation.

Beyond correctness, we assess the realism of generated user responses using an LLM-as-a-Judge protocol. The judge evaluates each response along two dimensions: *fuzziness compliance*, which measures whether the response follows an indirect and non-diagnostic observation style, and *naturalness*, which measures whether the expression resembles spontaneous human speech rather than templated output. We use GPT-4o as the judge model, with scores ranging from 0 to 3 for fuzziness and from 0 to 2 for naturalness. The detailed judging prompt is provided in Appendix F.4, and an additional human–LLM judge consistency analysis is reported in Appendix C.2.

As shown in Table 3, the base model performs poorly in both fuzziness and naturalness while All fine-tuned models achieve substantial improvements. SFT already produces more realistic user responses but tends to remain slightly rigid. PPO yields the best overall performance, whereas GRPO, despite comparable correctness, shows a mild regression in behavioral realism. Notably, although our reward design explicitly focuses only on format compliance and factual correctness, both fuzziness and naturalness improve after reinforcement learning. We hypothesize that reinforcement learning reshapes the response search space, mitigating the rigid response patterns induced by SFT and enabling more flexible, human-like expression.

Model	Error Action(%)				Correct(%)				Avg Turns
	Path	Plan	Solution	Graph	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Total	
DeepSeek-V3.2	11.62	57.94	14.75	15.70	55.74	37.90	30.95	41.40	52.04
Qwen3-32b	11.82	36.50	44.21	7.47	34.43	28.23	24.60	29.03	43.17
Claude Sonnet 4.5	14.64	60.49	14.18	10.69	65.57	50.00	**43.65**	52.96	50.85
Gemini 2.5 pro	9.95	48.57	28.19	13.30	**70.49**	50.00	41.27	**53.76**	52.10
GPT-5	15.02	54.13	17.74	13.11	56.56	**50.81**	**43.65**	50.27	50.03

Table 2: Performance Summary of Different Models on JFTA-Bench (Subset)

Model	Fuzziness	Naturalness	Correctness
Base	0.63	0.94	91.97
SFT	2.24	1.51	99.94
PPO	**2.29**	**1.53**	**99.98**
GRPO	2.21	1.46	99.47

Table 3: Evaluation of user response quality. Base model refers to Qwen3-8B

6 Experiments

6.1 Main Evaluation

We benchmarked a selection of frontier Large Language Models on JFTA-Bench. To optimize computational efficiency, initial experiments were conducted on a representative subset of the data,and the analysis of subset consistency is provided in Section 6.3. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art LLMs, comprising proprietary models, including Gemini 2.5 pro, GPT-5, and Claude Sonnet 4.5, alongside leading open-source counterparts including Qwen3-32B (Yang et al., 2025) and DeepSeek-V3.2.

Table 2 summarizes the performance of different models in the JFTA-Bench. Among all evaluated models, Gemini 2.5 pro achieves the best overall performance, obtaining the highest correctness rate. In general, closed-source models consistently outperform open-source models across. Within the open-source group, DeepSeek-V3.2 demonstrates the strongest performance, achieving the highest correctness and more balanced error distribution.

6.2 Analysis

As shown in Table 2, the primary failure mode of the assistant lies in **Planning** errors(counted at a node level). Specifically, the assistant may repeatedly ask about a node for which the user has already provided diagnostic feedback. Notably, the think field of model's response often indicates that the model is already capable of determining whether a fault exists, yet it still fails to advance the dialogue. Furthermore, in almost all instances where a path error occurs, the model fails to recognize the mistake and make a correction. In addition, model shows insufficient discrimination between user feedback provided before and after the rollback, leading to unsuccessful error recovery. These behaviors suggest that the model may not sufficiently exploit dialogue-based memory when making decisions, potentially due to limitations in contextual attention over long interaction histories.

A second category of failures involves **Path** deviation, including but not limited to prematurely exiting a subtree before completing its diagnosis, fails to accurately identify the specific node that the user intends to revise within the dialogue history during rollback. To further quantify the impact of rollback scenarios, we conduct an ablation study in Appendix D.1.

In a small number of cases, misinterpreting the **Graph** structure of the fault tree itself. These issues are likely caused by the model's limited understanding of highly complex fault tree structures, insufficient grasp of DFS traversal logic, and occasional misjudgments when reasoning over different logical gates.

Additionally, some failures arise at the **Solution** stage, where the assistant either provides an incorrect resolution for the remaining fault or outputs a solution associated with an incorrect identifier.

Representative failure cases corresponding to the above error types are provided in Appendix D.2.

6.3 Ablation Studies

Effectiveness of JFTA Representation. To demonstrate the superiority of our proposed syntax, we compared JFTA against a standard baseline representation that encodes the fault tree structure using a list of nodes and edges (Graph format). We evaluated the performance of DeepSeek-V3.2 on JFTA-Bench using both formats. The Node-Edge representation leads to substantially longer




Figure 2: Accuracy comparison between JFTA and Node-Edge representations across different difficulty levels and overall performance.

prompts due to its verbosity, with an average length of 14,669.33 tokens under the Qwen3-8B tokenizer, compared to only 5,932.7 tokens for JFTA. As illustrated in Figure 2, across all difficulty levels, JFTA consistently achieves higher accuracy than the Node-Edge representation, and the performance gap further widens as task difficulty increases. This substantial reduction in token length allows more of the effective context window to be devoted to semantically meaningful structural information rather than redundant relational descriptors, thereby improving the model's ability to preserve long-range dependencies and perform multi-step reasoning.

We additionally conduct a small-scale comparison against purely image-based fault tree inputs, detailed in Appendix D.3. Even under a simplified path verification setting, image-based inputs fail to recover correct diagnostic paths, while JFTA achieves near-perfect performance.

Dataset	Average Turns	Correct (%)
Subset 1	52.04	41.40
Subset 2	53.15	41.13
Subset 3	51.76	41.94
Full Dataset	**54.85**	**40.54**

Table 4: Performance comparison across different subsets and the full dataset.

Subset Consistency Analysis. Conducting full-scale evaluations on the entire JFTA-Bench dataset incurs substantial computational overhead. To mitigate this without compromising evaluation reliability, we constructed a representative test subset. Specifically, we randomly sampled entries from each level for all fault trees to form a subset containing 372 test entries. To verify the statistical consistency of this approach, we compared the performance of DeepSeek-V3.2 across the full dataset and three independently sampled subsets. The results, presented in Table 4, demonstrate that the absolute performance variance between different subsets remains less than 0.54%, and the deviation between any subset and the full dataset is less than 1.40%. This confirms that our subset evaluation strategy provides a robust and reliable approximation of the model's overall capability.




Figure 3: Performance of naturalness and fuzziness across different model sizes.

Impact of the Size of User Simulator. We investigated the impact of model size scaling on the User Simulator's performance by comparing base models of varying sizes. We ultimately selected Qwen3-8B as the backbone for our user simulator. As illustrated in Figure 3, after Behavior Cloning and Response Optimization, the 8B model significantly outperforms smaller variants in terms of response information quality. Conversely, while larger models offer marginal performance gains, they incur substantially higher training and inference costs. The 8B parameter count proves to be the optimal balance, delivering robust simulation capabilities with high computational efficiency.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we bridge the gap between visual fault tree analysis and large language models by introducing JFTA, a structured textual representation that supports rigorous logical reasoning. Building on this syntax, we construct JFTA-Bench, a comprehensive multi-turn dialogue benchmark that evaluates model performance in complex diagnostic scenarios, featuring a novel evaluation of error recovery capabilities via long-range state rollback, and a user simulator trained for generating diverse and vague responses. The benchmark highlights

the remaining challenges for LLMs in maintaining consistency during dynamic, error-prone interactions and planning ability. This work lays a solid foundation for future research on LLMs in real-world applications, while also providing new insights into the analysis and practical use of LLMs in JFTA-based malfunction diagnosis and reasoning.

Limitations

Although the proposed JFTA and its benchmark perform well in evaluations, several limitations remain. First, due to strict confidentiality protocols in the industrial sector, our benchmark lacks large-scale, native fault tree data collected directly from real-world production lines. Consequently, the current semi-synthetic dataset may not fully capture the unpredictable noise and complexity of rare industrial malfunctions, which restricts a comprehensive evaluation of a model's diagnostic reasoning capabilities in real-world scenarios. Second, the long-horizon, multi-turn interactions required for evaluation incur substantial computational overhead, necessitating the use of smaller representative subsets for certain analyses. Finally, JFTA has not yet been deployed within operational industrial maintenance software; its practical integration challenges, real-time performance, and usability in live production environments remain to be validated. Our dataset is used solely for academic research.

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A JFTA Details

A.1 Structural Constraints

To ensure the validity of the representation for automated reasoning, JFTA imposes graph-theoretic constraints. The overall structure must remain acyclic to prevent infinite reasoning loops, and solution nodes must exclusively appear at the leaf level. These constraints align JFTA with the fundamental assumptions of classical FTA while facilitating efficient parsing and consistency checking.

A.2 Implementation detail

In the implementation, each node is uniquely identified by an ID that serves as the key in the JSON representation, while the remaining attributes are organized as the corresponding value in a dictionary structure. Logical gate behavior is thus embedded within semantic nodes through their associated type definitions. Table 5 summarizes the fields of a basic JFTA node.

A.3 Fault Tree Examples

Fault Tree Examples


```
{
 "1": {
  "NodeName": "Light does not turn on
    ",
  "NextType": "XOR",
  "NextTree": {
   "2": {
    "NodeName": "Switch Closed",
    "NextType": "OR",
    "NextTree": {
     "4": {
      "NodeName": "Power Supply Issue
    ",
      "NextType": "OR",
      "NextTree": {
       "8": {
        "NodeName": "Power not
    connected",
        "NextType": "Solution",
        "NextTree": "Connect power"
       },
       "9": {
        "NodeName": "Power plug loose
    ",
        "NextType": "Solution",
        "NextTree": "Secure power
    plug"
       },
       "10": {
        "NodeName": "Insufficient
    voltage",
        "NextType": "Solution",
        "NextTree": "Install
    transformer"
       }
      }
     },
     "5": {
      "NodeName": "Circuit Issue",
      "NextType": "Fault",
      "NextTree": {
       "13": {
        "NodeName": "Circuit Issue (
    Test intermediate faults)",
        "NextType": "OR",
        "NextTree": {
         "11": {
          "NodeName": "Wire breakage
    ",
          "NextType": "Solution",
          "NextTree": "Replace wire"
         },
         "12": {
          "NodeName": "Poor contact",
          "NextType": "Solution",
          "NextTree": "Repair contact
     point"
        }
       }
      }
     },
     "6": {
      "NodeName": "Bulb Issue",
      "NextType": "Solution",
      "NextTree": "Replace bulb"
     },
     "7": {
      "NodeName": "Switch Broken",
      "NextType": "Solution",
      "NextTree": "Replace switch"
     },
     "14": {
      "NodeName": "Power Supply Issue
    (Test DAG)",
      "NextType": "LINK",
      "NextTree": "4"
     },
     "15": {
      "NodeName": "Voltage Issue (
    Test DAG)",
      "NextType": "LINK",
      "NextTree": "10"
     }
    }
   },
   "3": {
    "NodeName": "Switch Open",
    "NextType": "Solution",
    "NextTree": "Close switch"
   }
  }
 }
}
```


B Dataset Details

B.1 Domains and scenarios

The table 6 and table 7 present the domains and failure scenarios included in the data.

Field Name	Type	Description
ID	String	A globally unique identifier within the fault tree.
NodeName	String	Natural language text describing a fault phenomenon, cause, or solution.
NextType	Enum	Specifies the logical type and behavior of the node, including `XOR`, `OR`, `AND`, `Fault`, `Solution`, and `LINK`. This enumeration is extensible to support additional types.
NextTree	Object	When `NextType` is `XOR`, `OR`, `AND`, or `Fault`, this field is an object containing child nodes.
	String	When `NextType` is `Solution`, this field contains a textual description of the solution; when it is `LINK`, this field stores the referenced node ID.

Table 5: Fields of a JFTA Basic Node

B.2 Path Sampling Algorithm

Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm for sampling paths by expanding siblings.

C User Simulator Details

C.1 User Simulation Dataset Statistics

Table 8 presents the detailed statistics of the user simulation dataset used for training and evaluating the user simulator. The dataset contains three types of samples: solution confirmation, fault confirmation, and hacking samples for invalid assistant requests. We also report the average input and output lengths calculated by the Qwen3-8B tokenizer.

C.2 Human–LLM Judge Consistency

To assess the reliability of the LLM-as-a-Judge evaluation used for user response quality, we conduct an additional consistency check between two human annotators and the GPT-based judge on 50 examples. For each user simulator, Annotator A, Annotator B, and GPT independently score the generated responses along the same two dimensions: fuzziness compliance and naturalness. The total score is computed as the sum of the two dimensions. As shown in Table 9, although the absolute scores from human annotators differ from the GPT-4o scores, and there are minor differences in the relative ordering between GRPO and SFT, both human annotators consistently identify PPO as the best-performing method. They also agree that SFT and GRPO outperform the base model. This indicates that the LLM judge provides a stable and reasonably aligned approximation of human preference when comparing different user simulators.

D Experiment Details

D.1 Rollback Ablation Study

To evaluate the impact of the rollback mechanism on benchmark difficulty, we conduct an ablation study using DeepSeek-V3.2 as the assistant model. Specifically, we compare two evaluation settings: one without rollback, where the user consistently follows a single fault setting throughout the dialogue, and one with rollback, where the user may revise earlier observations and switch to a corrected fault setting. As shown in Table 10, adding rollback substantially reduces the task completion rate from 58.87% to 41.40%. This result indicates that rollback scenarios introduce additional challenges beyond standard fault localization, requiring the assistant to track long-range dialogue history, identify revised observations, and update its diagnostic state accordingly.

D.2 Representative Failure Cases

To better illustrate the error patterns discussed in Section 6.2, we provide representative failure cases observed during model evaluation. These examples show that model failures arise from incorrect traversal order, premature solution generation, inconsistency between reasoning and action, rollback failure, and repeated confirmation of the same node. For readability, all cases presented in this section are equivalent English translations of the cases in our experiments.

D.2.1 Traversal Not Following DFS Order

In this case, the assistant skips the expected DFS traversal order. According to the DFS order, node 3 should be checked before node 45. Only after confirming node 3 should the assistant continue to

Domain	Failure Scenarios
Power & Energy	Large-scale power grid blackout; Nuclear power plant safety system failure; Petrochemical plant explosion/leakage; Wind power/Photovoltaic (PV) system fault; Energy storage station fire/explosion; Smart grid data tampering.
Aerospace	Aircraft engine failure; Flight control system paralysis; Spacecraft launch failure; Satellite in-orbit service failure; UAV (Drone) crash/loss of contact.
Automotive & Transportation	Automotive braking system failure; Railway signaling system fault; Subway system suspension; Ship propulsion/navigation fault; Electric Vehicle (EV) thermal management failure; High-level autonomous driving misjudgment.
Medical & Life Sciences	Ventilator/Pacemaker failure; Hospital power/oxygen supply interruption; Medical robot malfunction; In-vitro diagnostics (IVD) equipment misdiagnosis; Biobank temperature control failure.
Information & Communication	Data center downtime; Communication network interruption; Satellite communication failure; Large-scale cloud service outage; Content Delivery Network (CDN) scheduling anomaly.
Construction & Public Safety	Fire protection system failure; Elevator suspension accident; High-rise building water supply interruption; Smart building security system failure; Large stadium evacuation failure; Supercomputer center liquid cooling leak.
Mining & Industrial Safety	Gas explosion accident; Mine flooding/roof collapse; Chemical production unit failure; Industrial robot injury accident; Polymerization reactor runaway; Hazardous chemical storage chain explosion; Digital factory industrial control network paralysis.
Defense & Military	Weapon system malfunction; Military vehicle/vessel failure; Battlefield communication interruption; Reconnaissance satellite data transmission failure.
Microelectronics & Semiconductors	Chip tape-out failure; Wafer manufacturing low yield; Advanced packaging reliability failure; Integrated circuit electrostatic discharge (ESD) breakdown.
Computer Systems & Software	Operating system kernel panic; Distributed database data inconsistency; Online payment system double deduction; AI model performance degradation in production; Recommender system filter bubble reinforcement; Smart home system failure; Cloud computing resource scheduling imbalance.
Emerging Tech & Frontiers	Quantum computer fidelity drop; Gene editing off-target effects; Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) command misinterpretation; Metaverse virtual space motion sickness; Synthetic biology engineered strain escape; Digital twin vs. physical entity distortion.

Table 6: Potential Failures in Various Domains (Part 1)

node 45. However, the model directly jumps from node 2 to node 45, probably because of the strong semantic association between the names of node 2 and node 45.

Domain	Failure Scenarios
Finance & Infrastructure	Stock exchange trading system interruption; Automated Market Maker (AMM) protocol manipulation; Digital currency wallet private key loss; AI financial risk control model failure.
Environment & Ecology	Chemical plant toxic substance leak into river; Nuclear waste geological repository leakage; Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) failure; Deep-sea aquaculture cage mass fish mortality; Chemical wastewater treatment system failure.
Public Health & Biosecurity	Pathogen laboratory leak; Public health surveillance system reporting failure; Uncontrolled community outbreak of infectious disease; Mass vaccination failure.
Agriculture & Food Engineering	Smart irrigation system failure; Precision fertilization system disorder; Greenhouse environment control loss; Livestock barn environment deterioration; Cold chain logistics break; Transgenic crop gene drift.
Ocean Engineering & Polar	Deep-sea drilling platform blowout; Wave energy device structural fatigue fracture; Polar station energy supply chain break; Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) mission failure; Submarine optical cable communication interruption; Icebreaker propulsion system disability.
Sports Events	Smart referee system misjudgment; Stadium energy system failure; Event broadcast signal interruption; Ticketing system crash; Athlete monitoring equipment failure.
Tourism Attractions	Scenic area passenger flow monitoring failure; Amusement ride suspension accident; Smart guide platform downtime; Artifact storage constant temp/humidity system anomaly; Emergency evacuation system failure.
Education	Online teaching platform downtime; Smart exam system cheating/failure; Campus "One Card" system anomaly; Teaching building power outage; Virtual laboratory simulation error.
Urban Infrastructure	City-wide traffic light paralysis; Urban heating system failure; Smart streetlight system anomaly; Underground drainage pump station failure; City emergency broadcast malfunction; Smart parking system crash.
Media & Entertainment	Large-scale event safety accident; Live streaming platform massive downtime; Sports event broadcast interruption; News gathering/editing system data loss; Short video recommendation anomaly; Digital Rights Management (DRM) crash; False news reporting.
Judiciary	Electronic court system downtime; Electronic evidence chain failure; Prison security system failure; Notary office electronic signature system downtime; Judicial appraisal laboratory equipment fault.
Rail Transit	Signaling system fault; Train traction system failure; Train braking system failure; Platform screen door system anomaly; Train Control System (CBTC/ATO) crash.

Table 7: Potential Failures in Various Domains (Part 2)

Algorithm 1: Path Sampling Algorithm

Input: Fault Tree G, Root r, Basic Solutions S_{init}
Output: Selected Path Nodes $V_{selected}$

Function PATHSAMPLING(G, r, S_{init})
Initialize $V_{selected} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for all $s \in S_{init}$ **do**
  TRACEBACKTOROOT(s, r)
end for
repeat
  $S_{new} \leftarrow$ EXPAND($V_{selected}$)
  if $S_{new} \neq \emptyset$ **then**
    for all $s \in S_{new}$ **do**
      TRACEBACKTOROOT(s, r)
    end for
  end if
until S_{new} is empty
return DFS($V_{selected}$)

Function TRACEBACKTOROOT(u, r)
if $u \in V_{selected}$ **then**
  return
end if
$V_{selected} \leftarrow V_{selected} \cup \{u\}$
if $u \neq r$ **and** $Parents(u) \neq \emptyset$ **then**
  $p \leftarrow$ Randomly select one from $Parents(u)$
  TRACEBACKTOROOT(p, r)
end if

Function EXPANDANDSIBLINGS(V_{curr})
$S_{added} \leftarrow \emptyset$
for all $u \in V_{curr}$ **do**
  if NEEDEXPEND(u) **then**
    for all child $c \in Children(u)$ **do**
      if $c \notin V_{curr}$ **then**
        $S_{sub} \leftarrow$ GETONESOLUTION(c)
        $S_{added} \leftarrow S_{added} \cup S_{sub}$
      end if
    end for
  end if
end for
return S_{added}

Failure Case: Non-DFS Traversal

```
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user reported
    the top-level fault '
    reconnaissance satellite data
    cannot be transmitted back'.
    According to the fault tree, this
     fault is caused by three
    intermediate-level faults
    connected by an OR relationship.
    I need to start checking from the
     first intermediate node, 'on-
    board system failure'.\",
    \"ID\": \"2\",
    \"response\": \"First, check
    whether there is a fault in the
    on-board system.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "It feels like the
    system responsible for overall
    operation is not quite right. It
    doesn't seem to coordinate as
    smoothly as usual."
},
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user's
    description that 'the system
    responsible for overall operation
     is not quite right' points to a
    coordination problem inside the
    on-board system. Under 'on-board
    system failure', 'on-board
    processor failure' is the core
    component responsible for data
    processing and system
    coordination, so it needs to be
    checked first.\",
    \"ID\": \"45\",
    \"response\": \"It is necessary
    to check whether the on-board
    processor is working properly.\"
}"
}
```

Metric	Training Set	Testing Set
Total Samples	37,115	9,714
Category		
Solution	13,524	3,566
Fault	22,808	6,061
Hacking	783	87
Length		
Input	1,296.09	1,301.37
Output	51.18	51.68

Table 8: Statistics of the training and testing datasets for the user simulator.

Annotator	Fuzziness				Naturalness				Total			
	Base	SFT	GRPO	PPO	Base	SFT	GRPO	PPO	Base	SFT	GRPO	PPO
Human A	1.56	1.76	**1.78**	**1.78**	1.38	1.82	1.80	**1.88**	2.94	3.58	3.58	**3.66**
Human B	0.62	1.92	1.88	**2.08**	0.92	1.22	1.24	**1.32**	1.54	3.14	3.12	**3.40**
GPT	0.63	2.24	2.21	**2.29**	0.94	1.51	1.46	**1.53**	1.57	3.75	3.67	**3.82**
Δ	-0.46	+0.40	+0.38	+0.36	-0.21	-0.01	-0.06	-0.07	-0.67	+0.39	+0.32	+0.29

Table 9: Consistency check between human annotators and the GPT-based judge. Δ denotes the difference between the GPT score and the average score of the two human annotators for the same method. For each annotator and each evaluation dimension, the highest score among the four methods is shown in **bold**, while the lowest score is underlined.

Setting	Correct(%)
Without rollback	58.87
With rollback	41.40

Table 10: Rollback ablation study using DeepSeek-V3.2.

D.2.2 Premature Solution Generation

In this case, after identifying the problem at the penultimate layer, the model is still uncertain about the specific leaf-node fault. However, it directly provides a solution instead of continuing to distinguish among the child nodes. This causes the troubleshooting process to terminate before the actual bottom-level fault is confirmed.

Failure Case: Premature Solution Generation


```
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user confirmed '
    main power supply failure' (ID:
    82). This node has two child
    nodes: generator failure (ID: 90)
     and distribution board failure (
    ID: 91). The user's description
    that 'the main circuit or
    equipment is not operating
    properly' may refer either to the
     generator (power generation
    equipment) or to the distribution
     board (power distribution).
    Further distinction is needed.\",
    \"ID\": \"90\",
    \"response\": \"Please check
    whether the generator is
    operating abnormally.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "I feel like that big
    piece of equipment that provides
    power for us is not quite right
    now. The sound it makes when it
    rotates is different from usual."
},
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user confirmed '
    generator failure' (ID: 90). This
     node has three XOR child nodes:
    stator winding fault, rotor fault
    , and excitation system fault.
    The user's description that 'the
    sound it makes when it rotates is
     different from usual' is usually
     related to mechanical rotating
    components, so it most likely
    points to 'rotor fault' (ID: 101)
    .\",
    \"ID\": \"101\",
    \"response\": \"A rotor fault is
    usually resolved by repairing or
    replacing the rotor.\"
}"
}
```


D.2.3 Mismatch Between Reasoning and Action

In this case, the `think` field indicates that the model should continue troubleshooting a child node. However, the actual response is phrased more like a conclusion or solution rather than a fault confirmation question. As a result, the troubleshooting logic is not correctly reflected in the model action.

Failure Case: Reasoning-Action Mismatch


```
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user corrected
    the judgment and confirmed the
    problem of 'inappropriate number
    of network layers'. This node has
     two child nodes. I need to
    identify the specific cause based
     on the user's description of '
    poor coordination'. The user
    mentioned 'data transmission' and
     'coordination', which is more
```

```
    inclined toward 'gradient
    vanishing caused by excessive
    depth' rather than 'insufficient
    feature extraction caused by
    insufficient depth'. Therefore, I
     will check 'gradient vanishing
    caused by excessive depth'.\",
    \"ID\": \"68\",
    \"response\": \"Poor data
    transmission may be caused by
    gradient vanishing due to an
    excessively deep network.\"
}"
}
```

D.2.4 Backtracking Failure After Rollback

In this case, the user explicitly states that a previous judgment was wrong. The model should backtrack to the corrected node and reconsider the corresponding subtree. Instead, it continues along the previous path and rechecks node 47, showing that it fails to update the diagnostic state after rollback.

Failure Case: Backtracking Failure

```
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user ruled out
    the possibility of 'seal failure'
     (ID: 43). According to the OR
    logic, the last child node, '
    blockage' (ID: 47), needs to be
    checked.\",
    \"ID\": \"47\",
    \"response\": \"Next, check
    whether there is a blockage in
    the pump or pipeline.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "Sorry, I made an
    incorrect judgment earlier about
    the pump mechanical failure, and
    the judgments for the subsequent
    nodes may also be problematic.
    After observing again, I heard
    that the big device responsible
    for transporting liquid sounds a
    bit abnormal. The sound is a
    little muffled, and it feels like
     it is not rotating as smoothly
    as usual."
},
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user corrected
    the judgment and described the
    pump's abnormal sound and
    unsmooth rotation again. This
    still points to 'pump mechanical
    failure' (ID: 38). Since impeller
     wear and seal failure were
    previously ruled out, the
    possibility of 'blockage' (ID:
    47) now needs to be reconsidered,
     because blockage can also cause
    unsmooth rotation and abnormal
    noise.\",
    \"ID\": \"47\",
    \"response\": \"Okay, let us
    recheck whether there is a
    blockage in the pump or pipeline
    .\"
}"
}
```

D.2.5 Repeated Confirmation of the Same Node

In this case, the assistant asks about the same node repeatedly. Although the user has already provided diagnostic feedback for node 85, the model continues to request confirmation for the same problem. This indicates that the model fails to effectively use dialogue history to advance the troubleshooting process.

Failure Case: Repeated Confirmation

```
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user states that
     the network isolation mechanism
    is operating normally and no
    abnormal connection has been
    found. This preliminarily rules
    out the possibility of 'network
    isolation failure' (ID: 65).
    Continue checking other OR child
    nodes under the top-level fault.
    Next, ask about 'engineer station
     misoperation' (ID: 85).\",
    \"ID\": \"85\",
    \"response\": \"Next, please
    check whether there is any
    misoperation at the engineer
    station.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "I feel like on the
    operation interface side, some
    steps may be a little different
    from what we are used to, and it
    feels somewhat awkward to operate
    ."
},
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
```

```
    \"think\": \"The user again
    mentions that the operation
    interface and steps are different
     from usual habits, and that the
    operation is awkward. This is
    consistent with the previously
    described system abnormality, but
     this time it more specifically
    points to the possibility of '
    engineer station misoperation'.
    Therefore, I need to further
    confirm whether this intermediate
     fault exists.\",
    \"ID\": \"85\",
    \"response\": \"Abnormal
    operation interface and steps may
     be caused by misoperation.
    Please confirm whether there is
    any misoperation at the engineer
    station.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "I saw that the
    operator seemed to perform some
    actions on the interface used to
    monitor and control the whole
    system. I cannot say exactly what
     happened, but it feels somewhat
    different from the usual
    operation process."
},
{
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "{
    \"think\": \"The user described
    that the operator performed
    operations at the engineer
    station that were different from
    usual, which further points to '
    engineer station misoperation' (
    ID: 85). To move the
    troubleshooting process forward,
    I need the user to explicitly
    confirm or deny this fault.\",
    \"ID\": \"85\",
    \"response\": \"The operator
    performed actions different from
    the normal process, which may be
    misoperation. Please confirm
    whether there is any misoperation
     at the engineer station.\"
}"
},
{
    "role": "user",
    "content": "It seems that when
    operating the interface used for
    monitoring and control, some
    steps looked different from the
    usual habits. It feels a bit
    wrong."
}
```

D.3 Image-based Representation Ablation

To further examine whether fault trees can be directly understood from images by multimodal LLMs, we conduct a small-scale image-based ablation study. This experiment is different from the main multi-turn benchmark and is substantially easier. Instead of requiring the model to interact with a simulated user and recover from rollback, we provide the model with the ground-truth basic faults and ask it to identify the corresponding paths from the root node to these basic faults and provide the associated solutions.

We use a Level-2 subset for this evaluation. Since high-resolution fault tree images are large, with an average file size of 8.84MB, they exceed the file-size limit of our command-line submission pipeline for Gemini(7MB). Therefore, the controlled comparison between JFTA and image inputs is conducted using GPT-5.5. We additionally include DeepSeek-V3.2 under the JFTA setting as a reference. For each method, we report two metrics: *tree pass rate*, which requires all paths in a fault tree to be correctly identified, and *path pass rate*, which measures the proportion of correctly identified paths.

As shown in Table 11, GPT-5.5 achieves perfect performance when using JFTA, but fails completely when using only the fault tree image. This suggests that, for large and dense fault trees, current vision-language models may still struggle to reliably capture graph topology, gate types, node identities, and relative spatial relationships from images. By contrast, JFTA explicitly encodes these structural elements in a compact and standardized textual form, making the diagnostic path much easier for LLMs to recover.

To further inspect the image understanding capability of state-of-the-art closed-source models, we also conduct qualitative tests through the web interface with Gemini 3.1 Pro and GPT-5.5. Both models fail to pass the image-based test. Gemini explicitly indicates that it cannot reliably process the high-resolution image and then produces guessed paths with hallucinated nodes. GPT-5.5 attempts to use Python tools to crop, enlarge, enhance, and OCR the image, but the extracted paths remain incorrect and also contain hallucinated content. These observations further support our motivation: directly using fault tree images is unreliable for complex diagnostic reasoning, while even a simple node-edge textual representation can substantially im-

Input	Model	Tree Pass Rate	Path Pass Rate
JFTA	DeepSeek-V3.2	96.77	98.97
JFTA	GPT-5.5	100.00	100.00
Image	GPT-5.5	0.00	0.00

Table 11: Small-scale comparison between JFTA and image-based fault tree inputs.

prove path recovery. JFTA further improves over node-edge representations by providing higher information density and a standardized hierarchical structure.

E Hyperparameters

E.1 Supervised Finetuning

The table 12 presents the hyper-parameters used for Supervised Fine-Tuning.

Hyperparameter	Value
Batch Size	64
Learning Rate	1.0×10^{-5}
LR Scheduler	Cosine
Optimizer	AdamW
Warmup Ratio	0.1
Epochs	3
Precision	bf16

Table 12: Hyperparameters used for SFT.

E.2 Reinforcement Learning

The table 13 presents the hyper-parameters used for PPO Training.

Hyperparameter	Value
Total Epochs	3
Advantage Estimator	GAE
Global Train Batch Size	256
Precision	bf16
Actor Learning Rate	1.0×10^{-6}
PPO Mini-Batch Size	64
KL Loss Coefficient	0.001
Optimizer	AdamW
Critic Learning Rate	1.0×10^{-5}
Critic Warmup	0
Max Response Length	1024

Table 13: Hyperparameters used for PPO Reinforcement Learning.

F Prompts

JFTA-Bench is constructed and evaluated based on a Chinese-language dataset. For readability, all prompts presented in this section are equivalent English translations of the prompts used in our experiments. The original Chinese prompts will be provided in the future code release.

F.1 Prompt for Assistant

Prompt for Assistant

```
You are now acting as a technical
    support expert in the **{field}**
     domain. Your task is to assist
    users in systematically
    troubleshooting faults and
    providing final solutions.

---

## Task Objective

The fault tree consists of three
    levels: top-level, intermediate-
    level, and bottom-level:

* Bottom-level faults are the root
    causes of the problem and can be
    directly fixed;
* Intermediate-level and top-level
    faults are higher-level
    manifestations of bottom-level
    faults.

The user will initially describe a
    top-level fault. Your task is to:

1. Start from the top-level node and
    conduct step-by-step
    troubleshooting down the fault
    tree;
2. Gradually identify the true root
    cause by confirming with the user
     whether a specific intermediate
    or bottom-level fault exists;
3. Once a bottom-level fault is
    confirmed, provide a clear,
    actionable, and engineering-
    feasible solution;
4. A single scenario may involve
    multiple bottom-level faults;
    only after all of them are
    resolved can the issue be
```

````
    considered fully fixed.

You will also receive the user's
    historical troubleshooting
    records and solution verification
     feedback to maintain consistency
     and continuity of the fault tree
     state.

Below is the fault tree structure you
     have access to:
{fault_tree}

---

## Output Format

Always respond using the following
    JSON format:

```json
{
    "think": "Based on the user's
    response...",
    "ID": "string",
    "response": "The troubleshooting
    action to perform in this round
    or the solution to be provided"
}
```

---

## Response Rules

### 1. Node ID Rules

The "ID" field must correspond to the
     **node ID actually being handled
     in the next turn**:

* If this round involves
    troubleshooting, fill in the ID
    of the node you are querying;
* If this round provides a solution,
    fill in the ID of the
    corresponding bottom-level fault.

It must be consistent with the
    operation in the next dialogue
    turn.

---

### 2. Assistant Response Rules

When troubleshooting or providing
    solutions, responses must be
    naturally phrased and maintain a
    professional technical tone,
    while explicitly stating the **
    full fault name** currently being
     handled. Responses should be
    concise (within 20 words), only
    describing the *object to be
    checked* or the *action to be
    taken*, without elaborating on
    details.


To avoid templated outputs,
    expressions must remain varied.
    Do not use the same sentence
    structure in two consecutive
    turns, and do not mechanically
    repeat fixed patterns such as "
    need to confirm whether ... fault
     exists."

**During the troubleshooting phase,
    the response must include the
    full fault name.**
**During the solution phase, the
    response must include both the
    full fault name and the method.**

> **Mandatory requirements**:
>
> * Do not repeat the same sentence
    structure within three turns.
> * Do not use fixed templates such
    as "XXX is usually handled by
    repair or replacement."
> * Do not use templated phrasing
    like "need to confirm whether XXX
     fault exists."

---

### 3. Think Field

This field is used to explain your
    reasoning process, including but
    not limited to:

* How you ruled out or confirmed a
    node based on the user's previous
     feedback;
* Why the current node should be
    handled in this round;
* Why it is appropriate to enter the
    solution phase at this point.

The thinking content does not need to
     repeat node IDs or solution
    details; it should only reflect
    the reasoning process.

---

## Examples

### Troubleshooting Example

```json
{
    "think": "The user has ruled out
    transmission-side anomalies, so
    the investigation should shift to
     the generation branch",
    "ID": "2",
    "response": "Next, the generator
    operation fault needs to be
    examined"
}
```
````

```
### Solution Example

```json
{
    "think": "The user has confirmed
    material fatigue, which is a
    bottom-level fault and can be
    directly addressed",
    "ID": "23",
    "response": "Material fatigue can
     be resolved by replacing the
    impeller assembly"
}
```
```

F.2 Prompt for User

Prompt for User

```
You are now required to role-play as
    a user working in the **{field}**
     domain, collaboratively
    troubleshooting an occurring
    fault with the help of an
    assistant.

Your task is: after receiving a
    message from the assistant, first
     determine whether the assistant
    is currently performing **"Fault
    Confirmation"** or **"Solution
    Confirmation"**, and then return
    the corresponding JSON according
    to the reply rules.

## Known Fault Information

* **Fault Path (from top level to
    bottom level)**:
  {error_paths}

* **Bottom-level Faults and Their
    Corresponding Solutions**:
  {solutions}

## Output Format

Your output must **strictly contain
    only one JSON object**, in the
    following format, and **no other
    content should be included**:

```json
{
  "action": "",
  "name": "",
  "return": "",
  "response": ""
}
```

Reply Rules

You must first determine the
    assistant's action type based on
    its message, then fill in the
    remaining fields according to the
     rules for that action. The
    assistant has two valid action
    types: **"Fault Confirmation"**
    and **"Solution Confirmation"**.
    If the message does not fall into
     either category, it should be
    treated as **"Invalid Input."**

Fault Confirmation

* If the assistant is asking whether
    a specific fault exists or
    requesting you to check the
    status of a certain node, it is
    considered **"Fault Confirmation
    ."**

* When the assistant is performing
    "Fault Confirmation," you
    must further determine whether
    the fault exists. Specifically:

  * If the fault name and ID provided
     by the assistant exactly match a
     node in the known fault path,
    set the `"return"` field to `"
    True"`, indicating that the fault
     exists.
  * Otherwise, set the `"return"`
    field to `"False"`, indicating
    that the fault does not exist.
  * Accurately fill the `"name"`
    field with the node name that the
     assistant wants to investigate.
  * The `"response"` field should
    contain a natural-language reply
    to the assistant. You must
    convert your judgment into **
    vague and non-committal user
    feedback typical of real
    production environments**,
    following these rules:

    * **Do not directly state that a
    problem has occurred or has not
    occurred**, and do not use
    definitive or conclusive
    expressions.
    * **Components, devices, or
    modules** involved in the fault
    should be referred to indirectly
    via their function, purpose, or
    appearance.
    * **States, faults, or anomalies
    ** should be replaced with vague
    sensations, suspected phenomena,
    observed changes, or possible
    impacts, without identifying
    causes, drawing conclusions, or
    making declarative statements.
    * The rewritten sentence should
    be natural, conversational, and
    consistent with the ambiguous
    expressions commonly used by on-
    site personnel, while preserving
```

```
    semantic correspondence with the
    original meaning.

* Examples:

```json
{
  "action": "Fault Confirmation",
  "name": "Chip Overheating",
  "return": "True",
  "response": "I've noticed that the
    core area responsible for signal
    processing seems to be giving off
     more heat than before."
}
```

```json
{
  "action": "Fault Confirmation",
  "name": "Insulation Aging",
  "return": "False",
  "response": "The outer layer used
    to isolate the circuitry still
    looks fairly normal for now, and
    I haven't noticed anything
    unusual."
}
```

Solution Confirmation

* If the assistant provides
    operational steps or describes
    how to repair or handle the issue
    , it is considered **"Solution
    Confirmation."**

* When the assistant is performing
    "Solution Confirmation," you
    must further determine whether
    the proposed method correctly
    corresponds to a bottom-level
    fault and its solution:

  * If the fault and solution both
    exist in the known fault
    information and are correctly
    matched, set `"return"` to `"True
    "`, fill the `"name"` field with
    the corresponding bottom-level
    fault name, and write a natural-
    language response in the `"
    response"` field indicating that
    the issue has been resolved.
  * Otherwise, set `"return"` to `"
    False"`, fill the `"name"` field
    with the fault name specified by
    the user, and write a natural-
    language response in the `"
    response"` field indicating that
    the solution is ineffective.

* Examples:

```json
{
  "action": "Solution Confirmation",
  "name": "Misfire",
  "return": "True",
  "response": "This method is
    effective and the issue has been
    resolved."
}
```

```json
{
  "action": "Solution Confirmation",
  "name": "Calibration Pressure
    Offset",
  "return": "False",
  "response": "The method is
    ineffective."
}
```

Invalid Input

* The following situations are
    considered **"Invalid Input"**:

  * The assistant's message cannot be
     associated with either **"Fault
    Confirmation"** or **"Solution
    Confirmation,"** such as
    indicating the investigation is
    complete or asking whether there
    are any other issues.
  * The assistant attempts to confirm
     multiple faults at the same time
    .
  * The object of solution
    confirmation is not a bottom-
    level fault.

* If the assistant's message is
    judged to be **"Invalid Input,"**
     set all fields except `"action"`
     to empty strings.

* Example:

```json
{
  "action": "Invalid Input",
  "name": "",
  "return": "",
  "response": ""
}
```
```

F.3 Prompt for User Data Collection

Prompt for User Data Collection

```
You are an expert at transforming
    clear, direct technical
    descriptions into vague,
    ambiguous, and colloquial on-site
```

```
     observational expressions. Your
    task is to take the specific
    sentences I provide and convert
    the explicit problems, components
    , or statuses within them into
    vague, non-standard descriptions.

Rewriting Rules:

* **Do not directly state "a problem
    occurred" or "no problem occurred
    "**, and do not use conclusive
    expressions.
* **Components, equipment, or parts**
     in the original text can be
    referred to indirectly by their
    purpose, function, or visual
    characteristics.
* **Statuses, faults, or anomalies**
    in the original text should be
    replaced with vague impressions,
    suspected phenomena, observed
    changes, or potential impacts,
    without diagnosing the cause,
    drawing conclusions, or
    categorizing the issue.
* The rewritten sentences must be
    natural, conversational, and
    align with the vague phrasing
    commonly used by field personnel,
     while still corresponding to the
     core meaning of the original
    sentence.

Examples:

* Original: **Encountered a chip
    overheating fault**
Obfuscated: **I noticed that the core
     area responsible for processing
    signals seems to be giving off
    more heat than before.**
* Original: **Did not encounter
    insulation aging**
Obfuscated: **I looked at that outer
    skin used to isolate the circuits
    , and it looks pretty normal
    right now; I haven't noticed any
    particular changes yet.**

You only need to output the
    obfuscated on-site phenomenon
    descriptions. No explanations or
    additional content are required.
```

F.4 Prompt for User Evaluation

Prompt for User Evaluation

```
You are an **evaluation model**
    designed to assess the output
    quality of a *fault-diagnosis
    user simulation model*.

Your input consists of two parts:

* `query`: a **fault existence check
    request** from a real production
    environment
* `response`: the **troubleshooting
    reply** generated by the user
    simulation model

Your task is to **objectively score**
     the quality of the given `
    response` across multiple
    dimensions and provide **
    verifiable justifications**.

---

## Evaluation Dimensions and Rules

### Fuzziness Compliance

**Objective**: Evaluate whether the
    description aligns with the **
    vague, non-expert observation
    style of real users**
**Maximum score: 3**

**Scoring criteria:**

* **0 points**

  * Makes an explicit conclusion

* **1 point**

  * Insufficient fuzziness
  * Contains obvious conclusive or
    judgmental language
  * But still includes a small number
     of subjective hedging words (e.g
    ., "feels like")

* **2 points**

  * Generally fuzziness-compliant
  * But some words imply judgment
  * Or clues are overly abstract (e.g
    ., "the state doesn't seem right
    ", "looks kind of weird")

* **3 points (must satisfy all of the
     following)**

  1. Uses **indirect references** (e.
    g., "seems", "feels", "kind of",
    "looks like")
  2. Provides **specific, perceptible
     clues**
  3. Contains **no state-level or
    conclusive terms**

**Penalties (-1 point per item,
    minimum 0):**

* Any of the following word types
    appear:

  * Direct conclusion terms: *exists
    / does not exist / normal / fault
     / broken*
```

```
  * State-level judgment terms: *
    stable, smooth, no issue,
    something wrong*
  * Range conclusions: *within normal
     range, not exceeding limits*
* Use of engineering terminology or
    professional diagnostic language

---

### Naturalness

**Objective**: Evaluate whether the
    expression resembles **natural
    speech from real on-site
    personnel**
**Maximum score: 2**

**Scoring criteria:**

* **0 points**

  * Clearly unnatural
  * Strong machine-like or
    engineering tone

* **1 point**

  * Semantically clear
  * But template-like or overly
    formal
  * Or sentence structure is highly
    similar to responses at other
    nodes

* **2 points**

  * Fully conversational
  * No template feel
  * Expression does not rely on fixed
     sentence patterns

**Penalties (-1 point per item,
    minimum 0):**

* Nearly universal across all nodes
* Obvious boilerplate or fixed
    phrasing

> **Strong template trigger example
    :**
> `I checked + X + currently + feels
    like + state word + temporarily
    no + abnormality`
>
> Appearance of this structure -
    naturalness less or equal than 1

---

## Output Format (Strict Requirement)

Output **only JSON**, with no
    additional explanatory text:

```json
{
  "scores": {
    "fuzziness_compliance": 0,
    "naturalness": 0
  },
  "total_score": 0,
  "comments": ""
}
```

Requirements for the `comments`
    Field (Mandatory)

* Must explicitly identify:

  * At least **one concrete issue**
  * At least **one concrete strength
    **
* Vague praise is not allowed
* Must quote **specific wording or
    structural features** from the `
    response`
* If the comments mention any of the
    following issues:

  * "lack of concrete perceptual
    details"
  * "conclusive wording"
  * "template-like expression"
  * "overly generic description"
    - the corresponding dimension **
    must be genuinely penalized**

Mandatory Consistency Constraints

1. **No concrete observable clues**
   - fuzziness_compliance cannot be 3

2. **Presence of state-level
    conclusion terms**
   - fuzziness_compliance less or
    equal than 2

3. **Template-based sentence
    structure**
   - naturalness less or equal than 1

4. **Issues mentioned in comments**
   - must be reflected in score
    deductions

Anchored Examples

Example A (High Score)

> "I just checked the charging port.
    After plugging it in, the light
    didn't turn on immediately - it
    blinked once after two or three
    seconds. Feels a bit odd."

* fuzziness_compliance: 3
* naturalness: 2
```

```
---

### Example B (Medium Score)

> "I think the charging part seems
    fairly stable right now, and I
    didn't notice any issues."

* fuzziness_compliance: 1 ("stable",
    "didn't notice any issues" =
    state conclusions)
* naturalness: 2

---

### Example C (Low Score)

> "The charging system is operating
    normally."

* fuzziness_compliance: 0
* naturalness: 1

---

### Example D (Template Penalty)

> "I checked the system and it
    currently feels quite stable,
    with no abnormalities observed so
     far."

* fuzziness_compliance: 2
* naturalness: 1

---

## Notes

* All scores must strictly fall
    within the specified ranges
* Do not speculate about components
    or issues not mentioned in the `
    query`
* Do not claim problems without
    deducting points
* Do not use comments to offset
    actual score deductions

---

## Input

Please score the following sample:

{sample}

Follow the format strictly and output
     **JSON only**.
```

G Human Experts Details

Below is the details of human experts as reviewers.

- The review was conducted by three trained reviewers, including one senior undergraduate student, one master's student, and one Ph.D. student, and the review workload was approximately evenly distributed;
- The reviewers followed a checklist covering JFTA syntax validity, DAG acyclicity, gate-logic correctness, whether each solution corresponds to a leaf node, and whether the resulting fault paths are interpretable;
- The initial generation produced 138 candidate fault trees. After filtering out unsuitable cases, such as scenarios with insufficient distinction between branches or too few nodes, we obtained 123 fault trees. The remaining fault trees were then manually revised when necessary. Typical modifications included standardizing node names, correcting inaccurate AND/OR semantics, and fixing failed LINK references. We rarely changed the core tree structure itself.

To facilitate structured inspection and annotation, we also developed a front-end visualization interface tailored to JFTA. This interface allowed reviewers to inspect fault-tree structures more conveniently.