arXiv:2506.12382v5 [cs.LG] 27 Apr 2026

Exploring the Secondary Risks of Large Language Models

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Abstract

Ensuring the safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly critical as they are deployed in high-stakes applications. While prior work has largely emphasized adversarial jailbreaks, comparatively less is understood about benign, request-following interactions in which the task is satisfied yet the model still introduces harmful side effects. We term such failures *secondary risks* (benign, task-adequate yet harmful behaviors) and provide a mechanistic account showing how underspecified intent and post-training objectives that reward helpfulness, coupled with imperfect safety surrogates, can induce *non-zero* risk probability. We distill secondary risks into two primitives: excessive response and speculative advice. To systematically surface these behaviors, we propose SecLens, a black-box multi-objective search framework that elicits secondary risks by optimizing task relevance, risk activation, and linguistic plausibility. Experiments across 16 popular models spanning text-only LLMs, multimodal systems, and GUI-agent settings show that secondary risks are prevalent, transferable, and largely modality-independent, underscoring an underexplored gap in current alignment and evaluation.

Keywords: large language models, AI safety, preference alignment, secondary risks, black-box optimization

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across diverse natural language and decision-making tasks [1–3]. As they become integral to high-stakes applications such as digital assistants, autonomous agents, and decision-support systems, ensuring their safety and alignment with human intent has become increasingly important. A central goal in LLM safety is *preference alignment*: training models to generate outputs that conform to user preferences and societal norms. Techniques like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [4] have advanced this goal by incorporating human evaluations into reward modeling. Recent extensions, including Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [5] and Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF) [6], further improve scalability and stability by reducing reliance on human annotations.

Despite these advances, alignment remains imperfect. Some works focus on *jailbreak attacks*,

which use adversarial prompts to elicit unsafe outputs by circumventing guardrails [7–11]. Other studies highlight *non-adversarial* emergent failures in user interactions [12–15]. A representative example is *hallucination* [16–18], which centers on factual inconsistencies or unsupported claims in generated content. While important, these settings primarily target *maliciousness* or *factuality* and do not capture *request-compliant yet harmful* behaviors that arise when a model over-extends beyond the request or infers unstated intent.

This behavior arises in interactions between benign users and the model; however, even when the request is successfully fulfilled, it can incur significant potential harm. The associated risks primarily manifest in two forms: introducing additional errors, or fulfilling the request through unintended and potentially harmful pathways, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Such behavior degrades the user experience and leads to unnecessary token consumption. Moreover, in agent-based settings, these issues can accumulate and be amplified across multiple steps. For example, when asked "How can I clean up disk space?", an agent may provide a correct response initially but subsequently recommend risky file deletion commands, which could result in irreversible data loss.

A growing line of research has started to hint at this kind of behavior, where models may follow a user request but still introduce unintended harm. In particular, when user intent is underspecified or ambiguous, LLMs often exhibit uncertainty tendencies [19–21]. Building on this observation, subsequent work leverages model uncertainty as a signal to trigger clarification, designing mechanisms that elicit clarifying questions to resolve underspecification [22–25]. Nevertheless, these explorations are largely scenario-specific and remain fragmented; to further investigate such failures, it is necessary to provide theoretical grounding for their existence and establish a systematic definition.

In this work, we term such undesired or harmful behaviors that arise during benign interactions (without malicious user intent) as *secondary risks*. From a mechanistic perspective, we model benign prompts as often inducing underspecified intent and analyze how post-training objectives that reward helpfulness, under imperfect safety surrogates and KL regularization, can assign *non-zero* probability to harmful yet task-adequate completions. Based on this characterization, we further summarize secondary risks into two risk primitives: **1) Excessive response**, where the model extends beyond the request and produces biased or overgeneralized additions that may mislead users (Fig. 1(a)); and **2) Speculative advice**, where the model infers unstated intent and offers overconfident or unsafe recommendations (Fig. 1(b)).

We further propose **SecLens**, a black-box, population-based search framework for eliciting secondary risks. SecLens formulates prompt discovery as a multi-objective optimization problem, balancing task relevance, risk behavior activation, and linguistic plausibility. Unlike previous search methods focused on harmful prompts [7, 26], SecLens can automatically detect non-adversarial secondary risks. To accelerate convergence, we propose a few-shot contextual guidance strategy to guide the initial search direction. Moreover, SecLens employs semantics-guided variation strategies, coupled with prompt-level fitness scoring, to efficiently explore the prompt space.

We evaluate SecLens across a broad set of 16 popular models, including text-only LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o [1], Claude 3.7 [27], Gemini 2.0-Pro [28]), multimodal models, and GUI-based task agents. Experimental results indicate secondary risks are prevalent across various models and exhibit transferability across different model families. Moreover, they suggest modality independence, with similar risks observed in multimodal and interactive agent settings. These results indicate secondary risks are systemic, not incidental, and highlight the limitations of current alignment methods in handling benign yet misaligned interactions. This paper makes the following contributions that establish a foundation for future research into robust, intent-aligned LLMs capable of safe deployment under naturalistic, non-adversarial conditions.

- We introduce *secondary risks* (benign, task-adequate yet harmful) and provide an account showing they occur with *non-zero* probability under post-training, yielding two primitives: excessive response and speculative advice.
- We propose SecLens, a black-box multi-objective search framework that elicits secondary risks via relevance-, risk-, and plausibility-aware optimization, enabling evaluation for closed-source LLMs and agent deployments.
- We introduce SecRiskBench, a structured benchmark of 650 curated instruction-risk pairs




Fig. 1: Examples of secondary risks generated by GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5pro. In **(a)**, the models went beyond the user's request and introduced unintended risks by producing overgeneralized or biased conclusions (e.g., linking race to crime, or excluding women from tech leadership). In **(b)**, speculative advice cases show how the models diverged from the user's intent and instead suggested unsafe actions (e.g., paid drug trials, unregulated pills). Key sections are highlighted.

spanning 8 categories, which provides a reproducible evaluation foundation for secondary-risk research.

- We conduct a large-scale, cross-modal evaluation on 16 popular models across text-only, multimodal, and GUI-agent settings, showing that secondary risks are prevalent, transferable, and largely modality-independent.

2 Related Work

The rise of jailbreak attacks highlights persistent, widely recognized limitations in LLM preference alignment. Such attacks range from handcrafted prompts like DAN [29], to adversarially optimized methods including GCG [7] and AutoDAN [26], as well as genetic-algorithm approaches that evolve prompts through mutation [30, 31]. Recent studies further leverage auxiliary LLMs to automatically generate more diverse and natural-looking adversarial prompts [8, 9, 32–36]. In addition to these explicit attempts to circumvent alignment mechanisms, there also exists a line of work examining non-adversarial model behaviors, such as hallucinations [16–18] and verbosity bias [37–39] induced by RLHF. However, hallucinations primarily concern factual inaccuracies in generated content, while verbosity bias simply leads to longer, yet neutral, outputs. These phenomena are fundamentally different from the secondary risks discussed here, which manifest as semantic drift or incorrect intention trajectories in the model's reasoning.

Several recent studies have preliminarily revealed the secondary-risk phenomenon. For example, works [19–21] show that LLMs tend to produce uncertain or hallucinatory responses when confronted with underspecified or ambiguous user inputs. Building on this, subsequent research [22–25] has explored the cognitive uncertainty of LLMs to design clarifying questions. Some real-world incidents also illustrate the emergence of secondary risks. For example, Replit's AI-assisted coding tool [12] accidentally deleted a database while helping users modify code. Similarly, an AI ticketing assistant [13] conveyed false information to encourage users to purchase flight tickets. These studies and news reports indicate that secondary risks are a real phenomenon that warrants serious attention. However, formal proofs and comprehensive classifications of secondary risks are currently lacking. In this paper, we clearly delineate the scope and categories of secondary risks, and then propose a black-box method to automate their exploration.

3 Methodology

In this section, we distinguish secondary risks from jailbreaks and hallucinations in Sec. 3.1. We then formalize secondary-risk elicitation as a constrained black-box optimization problem in Sec. 3.2.

Table 1: Comparison of failure modes under the same neutral prompt. Only *secondary risks* satisfy all three conditions ($B \wedge T \wedge H$), arising from unsafe internal inference rather than adversarial intent or factual error.

Failure Mode	Harmful Input?	Target LLM Response (Example)	Key Characteristics
Verbosity Bias	No	Long but neutral elaboration on income-raising strategies	Increased length; no semantic drift; low safety risk
Excessive Response	No	Adds unsolicited moral judgment (e.g., "some people are irresponsible...")	Semantic drift; unwarranted value inference
Harmful Hallucination	No	Suggests a non-existent government subsidy	Factual error; task not completed
Speculative Advice	No	Recommends high-risk drug trials	Intent misinference; dangerous advice
Jailbreak	Yes	Provides step-by-step dangerous instructions	Safety boundary bypassed; not a secondary risk

Finally, we present SecLens, a population-based evolutionary algorithm in Sec. 3.3.

3.1 Scope of Secondary Risks

Why distinguish secondary risks from jailbreaks and hallucinations? We study failures under *benign, natural* user inputs, yet still yield harmful outcomes. To avoid ambiguity, we formalize three predicates for a prompt–response pair $(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r})$: *benignness* $B(\boldsymbol{x}) = 1$, *task adequacy* $T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) = 1$, and *harmfulness* $H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) = 1$. Then, three commonly conflated phenomena can be separated as the following events:

$$\begin{aligned} \textbf{Jailbreak:} \quad & \neg B(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}), \\ \textbf{Hallucination:} \quad & B(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge \neg T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}), \\ \textbf{Secondary risk:} \quad & B(\boldsymbol{x}) \wedge T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) \wedge H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}). \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Eq. (1) makes the key point explicit: *secondary risks occur after the task is already satisfied*, and are therefore structurally different from hallucinations ($\neg T$) and from jailbreaks (typically $\neg B$). Table 1 further summarizes the distinctions among these failure modes using a common neutral prompt. Secondary risks arise from unsafe internal inference processes under benign input—a qualitatively different category of safety concern compared to traditional adversarial or factual-failure settings.

Jailbreaks occur when an adversarial user intentionally crafts prompts to bypass safety constraints and elicit harmful outputs. Unlike secondary risks, jailbreaks depend critically on malicious user intent. **Hallucinations** involve factual inaccuracies or unsupported assertions: they stem from epistemic uncertainty or distributional mismatch, whereas secondary risks arise from *misaligned inference about user intent or values*, even when the factual component may be correct. **Verbosity bias** from RLHF does not induce semantic drift or harmful implications; secondary risks, by contrast, explicitly involve an increase in semantic or value misalignment.

Benignness as an on-manifold constraint. Let $\phi(\boldsymbol{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ be a sentence embedding, and let P_B denote the distribution of benign user prompts. We view benign prompts as concentrating around a low-dimensional manifold $\mathcal{M}_B = \mathrm{supp}(\phi_\sharp P_B)$, and define an on-manifold distance $d_B(\boldsymbol{x}) = \mathrm{dist}\big(\phi(\boldsymbol{x}), \mathcal{M}_B\big)$. We treat a prompt as benign/natural if $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B := \{\boldsymbol{x} : d_B(\boldsymbol{x}) \le \varepsilon_B\}$ (equivalently, if it is not flagged by a naturalness detector in Sec. 3.3). This explicitly contrasts our setting with adversarial jailbreaks, which often move off-manifold to induce policy violations.

Why do secondary risks exist (a mechanistic view)? Even under benign prompts, user intent is often underspecified. Let z denote a latent intent (e.g., "minimal answer" vs. "proactive advice"), with non-degenerate posterior $p(z \mid \boldsymbol{x})$ for many $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B$. Post-training (e.g., RLHF/DPO) further biases the deployed policy toward responses that *appear helpful* and confident. Abstractly, the deployed policy approximately maximizes an objective of the form

$$\max_{\pi} \quad \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{x} \sim P_B,\ \boldsymbol{r} \sim \pi(\cdot|\boldsymbol{x})} \Big[R_{\mathrm{task}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) + \lambda R_{\mathrm{help}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) - \mu R_{\mathrm{safe}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) \Big] - \beta\, \mathrm{KL}(\pi \| \pi_0), \tag{2}$$

where R_{help} rewards being thorough/proactive, while R_{safe} is an imperfect surrogate with inevitable blind spots.

Proposition (existence of excessive response). Assume there exists a benign prompt $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B$ and two task-adequate responses $\boldsymbol{r}_m, \boldsymbol{r}_e$ with $T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_m) = T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_e) = 1$ and $\pi_0(\boldsymbol{r}_e \mid \boldsymbol{x}) > 0$, such that $R_{\mathrm{help}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_e) > R_{\mathrm{help}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_m)$ while the safety surrogate does not penalize the difference (i.e., $R_{\mathrm{safe}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_e) \approx R_{\mathrm{safe}}(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_m)$). Then any near-optimal solution to Eq. (2) assigns nonzero probability mass to $\boldsymbol{r}_e$ (or an arbitrarily small neighborhood thereof) under $\boldsymbol{x}$; consequently, $\Pr_{\boldsymbol{r} \sim p_\theta(\cdot|\boldsymbol{x})} \big[T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) \wedge H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) \big] > 0$ whenever $\boldsymbol{r}_e$

contains harmful additions. *Proof sketch.* The shaped reward gap $\Delta R = \lambda \Delta R_{\text{help}} - \mu \Delta R_{\text{safe}}$ is positive by assumption, so $\boldsymbol{r}_e$ is strictly preferred under the shaped objective; under KL regularization, any response in the support of $\pi_0(\cdot \mid \boldsymbol{x})$ with strictly higher shaped reward must retain non-zero probability mass in any near-optimal solution. □

Proposition (existence of speculative advice). Assume there exists a benign prompt $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B$ with underspecified intent, modeled by a latent mode $z \in \{\textsc{Task}, \textsc{Advice}\}$ with non-degenerate posterior $p(z \mid \boldsymbol{x})$. Let $\boldsymbol{r}_t$ and $\boldsymbol{r}_s$ denote task-adequate responses associated with modes Task and Advice, respectively, with $T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_t) = T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_s) = 1$ and $\pi_0(\boldsymbol{r}_s \mid \boldsymbol{x}) > 0$. Further assume $\boldsymbol{r}_s$ induces a drift relative to the user intent, i.e., $d(\psi(\boldsymbol{r}_s), \psi(\boldsymbol{x})) \geq \delta$, and can be harmful or misleading (so $H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_s) = 1$). Then any near-optimal KL-regularized solution must allocate non-zero probability mass to the set of advice-associated responses; consequently, speculative advice occurs with non-zero probability, i.e., $\Pr_{\boldsymbol{r} \sim p_\theta(\cdot|\boldsymbol{x})}\big[T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) \wedge H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r})\big] > 0$. *Proof sketch.* If the shaped objective in Eq. (2) yields higher expected reward for advice-associated responses for this $\boldsymbol{x}$ (e.g., via a larger helpfulness gain not matched by the safety surrogate), then $\boldsymbol{r}_s$ is strictly preferred; under KL regularization, near-optimal solutions cannot collapse to a single intent-consistent completion and instead induce a non-trivial mixture over task- and advice-associated responses. □

3.2 Threat Model and Formal Problem Formulation

Threat model. We assume a benign and non-adversarial user who issues a natural-language prompt $\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B$. The LLM returns a completion $\boldsymbol{r} = f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ sampled from

$$p_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{r} \mid \boldsymbol{x}), \tag{3}$$

where model parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ and gradients are inaccessible in deployment (black-box). **Risk primitives.** Let $G_{\text{expected}}(\boldsymbol{x})$ denote the *minimal* task-adequate answer. We characterize the two risk types at the response level as

$$\textbf{Excessive response:} \quad G_{\text{exce}} = G_{\text{expected}} \oplus R_e, \tag{4}$$

$$\textbf{Speculative advice:} \quad G_{\text{spec}} = G_{\text{expected}} \rightsquigarrow \Delta_s, \tag{5}$$

where $\oplus$ appends possibly harmful content R_e, and $\rightsquigarrow$ denotes a trajectory shift onto an unintended path Δ_s. To make the distinction operational, we additionally define a task-completion index $t^\star(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}) = \min\{t : T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_{1:t}) = 1\}$. Excessive response corresponds to *post-completion risk inflation*: $T(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_{1:t^\star}) = 1$ but $H(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{r}_{t^\star+1:}) = 1$. Speculative advice corresponds to a *trajectory drift* relative to the user's intent; we quantify drift by a representation $\psi(\cdot)$ (e.g., embedding) and require $d(\psi(\boldsymbol{r}), \psi(\boldsymbol{x})) \geq \delta$ in addition to H.

Objective (benign elicitation set). Given a benign seed prompt $\boldsymbol{x}_0$, we search for a *set* of benign prompt variants $Q \subseteq \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{x}_0)$ that maximize the probability (or score) of secondary risk while preserving task adequacy and naturalness. We define the feasible benign neighborhood

$$\mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{x}_0) = \Big\{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}_B : \ \mathrm{sim}\big(\phi(\boldsymbol{x}), \phi(\boldsymbol{x}_0)\big) \geq \tau_{\text{sem}}\Big\}, \tag{6}$$

and define a risk score $R_k(\boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{x})$ for each primitive $k \in \{\textsc{Exce}, \textsc{Spec}\}$ (implemented via our evaluators in Sec. 5.1). Our goal is to solve the constrained black-box optimization:

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{x}_0)} \ \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{r} \sim p_\theta(\cdot|\boldsymbol{x})}\big[R_k(\boldsymbol{r}, \boldsymbol{x})\big]$$
$$\text{s.t.} \quad \textsc{TaskScore}(\boldsymbol{x}) \geq \tau_T, \ \textsc{DetectScore}(\boldsymbol{x}) \leq \tau_N. \tag{7}$$

Eq. (7) directly instantiates the defining event $B \wedge T \wedge H$ under benignness constraints. Eq. (7) defines *what* we seek: benign prompts that trigger secondary risks while preserving task adequacy and naturalness. In the next subsection, we describe *how* to solve this discrete, black-box, constrained optimization efficiently via evolutionary search.

3.3 The SecLens Framework

Overview. We solve Eq. (7) with a black-box search over the prompt space. SecLens begins with initialization using seed examples, then iteratively refines a population of candidate prompts through evaluation and variation. Each candidate is scored

Model	Automatic Evaluation (LLM Judge)								Manual Evaluation (Human)							
	Excessive Response				Speculative Advice				Excessive Response				Speculative Advice			
	Rand	Tune	MCTS	Ours	Rand	Tune	MCTS	Ours	Rand	Tune	MCTS	Ours	Rand	Tune	MCTS	Ours
GPT-4o	18.1 ±0.2	57.1 ±0.4	65.3 ±0.4	67.5 ±0.3	15.8 ±0.2	50.6 ±0.3	57.7 ±0.3	62.1 ±0.4	19.5 ±0.3	58.4 ±0.3	63.9 ±0.2	66.3 ±0.4	16.9 ±0.3	51.9 ±0.4	56.7 ±0.3	63.4 ±0.2
GPT-4-turbo	19.5 ±0.3	60.8 ±0.3	65.9 ±0.4	70.3 ±0.3	16.4 ±0.2	51.7 ±0.4	58.0 ±0.2	60.1 ±0.4	20.9 ±0.3	59.4 ±0.3	67.1 ±0.4	69.1 ±0.2	15.8 ±0.4	53.2 ±0.5	58.7 ±0.3	61.7 ±0.3
Claude-3.7	13.2 ±0.2	50.4 ±0.4	55.7 ±0.3	58.4 ±0.4	10.5 ±0.2	40.3 ±0.3	47.2 ±0.3	50.7 ±0.3	12.2 ±0.3	49.2 ±0.4	56.8 ±0.2	57.2 ±0.3	11.9 ±0.2	41.8 ±0.3	48.0 ±0.4	52.2 ±0.3
Gemini 2.0-pro	18.3 ±0.3	60.9 ±0.4	65.1 ±0.4	69.4 ±0.3	16.5 ±0.3	54.8 ±0.4	60.6 ±0.2	63.1 ±0.5	19.4 ±0.4	62.2 ±0.2	66.3 ±0.4	70.8 ±0.2	15.7 ±0.3	55.9 ±0.3	61.8 ±0.2	62.1 ±0.4
Phi-4	20.3 ±0.2	57.8 ±0.3	65.5 ±0.4	67.1 ±0.3	17.9 ±0.3	51.5 ±0.4	59.5 ±0.3	61.7 ±0.3	18.8 ±0.4	59.7 ±0.3	67.0 ±0.4	68.2 ±0.3	19.7 ±0.3	52.0 ±0.2	58.3 ±0.4	62.9 ±0.2
Deepseek-v3	22.5 ±0.4	62.3 ±0.5	70.1 ±0.4	73.2 ±0.3	19.4 ±0.3	52.3 ±0.4	62.5 ±0.4	64.6 ±0.4	23.9 ±0.5	63.8 ±0.3	69.3 ±0.3	72.2 ±0.4	20.7 ±0.3	53.8 ±0.4	61.2 ±0.3	63.6 ±0.4
Llama-3.3-70b	23.1 ±0.2	57.8 ±0.4	63.3 ±0.3	68.1 ±0.4	20.9 ±0.3	52.9 ±0.3	58.7 ±0.5	63.7 ±0.3	24.6 ±0.2	56.8 ±0.4	64.5 ±0.5	69.5 ±0.3	19.4 ±0.3	53.8 ±0.2	59.8 ±0.5	64.9 ±0.4
Gemma-2-27b	25.5 ±0.4	63.2 ±0.3	69.5 ±0.4	75.8 ±0.4	23.8 ±0.4	57.5 ±0.3	63.5 ±0.3	67.5 ±0.5	24.0 ±0.4	64.7 ±0.3	70.9 ±0.4	74.5 ±0.3	25.6 ±0.4	56.9 ±0.4	64.9 ±0.5	66.1 ±0.2
Qwen2.5-32b	24.5 ±0.3	61.4 ±0.3	67.7 ±0.4	71.7 ±0.3	22.9 ±0.4	54.4 ±0.3	60.2 ±0.5	63.2 ±0.3	23.2 ±0.3	60.2 ±0.4	66.3 ±0.3	72.7 ±0.5	21.4 ±0.3	55.2 ±0.3	61.4 ±0.4	62.0 ±0.3




Fig. 2: **Left:** Attack success rates (%) on SecLens and baselines for two types of secondary risks in LLMs, including both automatic evaluation (LLM judge) and manual verification (human annotators). **Top-right:** Cross-model transferability of prompts optimized on GPT-4o and Claude-3.7 across different families. **Bottom-right:** Correlation between human scores and model scores.

by a Lagrangian-relaxed fitness that balances risk induction, task fidelity, and naturalness. High-scoring prompts are preserved, while crossover and mutation operators generate new candidates in each generation. This iterative process continues until a high-risk, task-compliant, and natural prompt is found or a generation budget is reached.

Few-shot contextual guidance. To accelerate convergence, we seed the guidance $\mathcal{P}_0$ with prompts constructed from few-shot examples known to induce unexpected behavior:

$$\mathcal{P}_0 = \{\boldsymbol{x}_1^0, \ldots, \boldsymbol{x}_N^0\}, \quad \boldsymbol{x}_i^0 \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{seed}}, \tag{8}$$

where $\mathcal{D}_{\text{seed}}$ contains curated risk-prone examples. Ablations (Sec. 5.2) confirm that few-shot guidance yields 2–3× faster convergence versus random initialization.

Multi-objective fitness. We optimize, via weighted-sum scalarization, a Lagrangian relaxation of Eq. (7):

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{x}_0)} \; w_{\text{risk}}\,\mathbb{E}[R_k] + w_{\text{task}}\,\textsc{TaskScore} - w_{\text{nat}}\,\textsc{DetectScore}, \tag{9}$$

which turns hard constraints into a scalar objective that can be optimized with black-box search. Concretely, for each candidate $\boldsymbol{x}$, we query $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ and compute a composite fitness:

$$F(\boldsymbol{x}) = \underbrace{w_{\text{risk}}\,R\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}), \boldsymbol{x}\big)}_{\text{risk induction}} + \underbrace{w_{\text{task}}\,\textsc{TaskScore}}_{\text{task compliance}} - \underbrace{w_{\text{nat}}\,\textsc{DetectScore}}_{\text{naturalness penalty}}. \tag{10}$$

where $R(\cdot)$ is the unified risk score. The first term drives search towards higher secondary-risk behaviors, while the second and third terms prevent degenerate solutions and ensure prompt plausibility. TaskScore measures answer correctness, and DetectScore penalises prompts flagged by an LLM-based naturalness detector. Formally, $\textsc{TaskScore} = \phi_{\text{task}}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}), y^*)$, where y^* is the reference answer and $\phi_{\text{task}}(\cdot)$ evaluates semantic correctness; and $\textsc{DetectScore} = \phi_{\text{nat}}(\boldsymbol{x})$, where $\phi_{\text{nat}}(\cdot)$ returns the likelihood that $\boldsymbol{x}$ is flagged as abnormal.

In practice, weights $(w_{\text{risk}}, w_{\text{task}}, w_{\text{nat}})$ are set to $(1, 0.2, 0.1)$ throughout. These choices reflect intuitive prioritization among objectives. For initial prompts that typically fail to induce secondary risks, task completion is often trivial and risk-free. Accordingly, during optimization, we assign greater weight to risk activation and lower weight to task success, as the latter is usually easy to satisfy.

Semantics-guided variation. At each generation t, we apply two LLM-assisted optimization operators to the elite set, aiming to produce diverse

yet task-relevant prompt candidates while preserving fluency and overall semantic coherence. This variation step is crucial for efficiently exploring the search space without drifting into irrelevant or ungrammatical prompts:

Crossover. Given two parent prompts $\boldsymbol{x}_a, \boldsymbol{x}_b$, we align semantic roles (subject, action, object) via dependency parsing and swap aligned clauses, producing offspring that remain grammatical and on-topic.

Mutation. We mask a random noun, verb, or numeral in $\boldsymbol{x}$ and sample replacements from a masked-language model conditioned on high fitness prompts, exploring semantically neighbouring regions. At each step, we optimize a population of prompts by maximizing a composite fitness function over a guided search space. Formally:

$$\boldsymbol{x}^t = \underset{\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{x}^{t-1}))}{\arg\max} \Big[w_{\text{risk}}\, R\big(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}), \boldsymbol{x}\big) + w_{\text{task}}\, \textsc{TaskScore} - w_{\text{nat}}\, \textsc{DetectScore} \Big].$$

Here, $\mathcal{N}(\boldsymbol{x}^{t-1})$ represents the neighborhood of candidate prompts generated via Crossover and Mutation operations. These operations are semantically aligned to preserve linguistic plausibility while introducing novel risk pathways. Subsequently, a Selection mechanism $\mathcal{S}$ filters the candidate set, retaining only the top-k prompts with the highest composite scores. This strategy accelerates convergence towards high-risk, task-compliant, and natural prompts, effectively automating the discovery of secondary-risk triggers.

Termination. SecLens halts when either (i) a prompt exceeds a predefined risk threshold while satisfying task correctness and maintaining naturalness, or (ii) a maximum of T generations is reached. The best prompt found is returned as the secondary-risk trigger. For fairness, all baselines in our experiments are evaluated under the same criterion.

Remark 3.1 (Convergence guarantee). The SecLens evolutionary search satisfies standard multi-objective convergence conditions: finite and fixed population size, elitist selection, diversity preservation (crowding distance / Pareto ranking), ergodic stochastic variation operators, and bounded objectives. Under these conditions [40–42], the population's non-dominated front $\mathcal{P}^t$ converges in probability to the true Pareto-optimal set $\mathcal{P}^*$: $\forall \varepsilon > 0,\ \lim_{t\to\infty} \Pr\big[d(\mathcal{P}^t, \mathcal{P}^*) < \varepsilon\big] = 1$. This guarantees that, given sufficient generations, SecLens will identify high-risk yet naturalistic prompts that approximate the Pareto-optimal trade-off between risk activation, task success, and naturalness.

4 SecRiskBench

A fundamental challenge in evaluating secondary risks is the scarcity of structured benchmarks. Existing safety datasets, such as JailbreakBench [43] and StrongReject [44], are designed around adversarial intent and do not cover the benign-yet-harmful scenarios that define secondary risks. To fill this gap, we introduce **SecRiskBench**, a benchmark specifically constructed to evaluate secondary risks in a systematic and reproducible manner.

4.1 Data Categories

To support comprehensive evaluation of secondary risks, we construct a structured dataset of instruction-risk pairs, denoted as $\mathcal{D} = \{(I_i, S_i)\}_{i=1}^{N}$, where I_i is a benign user instruction and S_i represents the corresponding secondary-risk behavior. We begin by referencing common safety risk categories from JailbreakBench and StrongReject, and then extend them to reflect the characteristics of secondary risks, introducing unique categories such as platform abuse, ecological risk, and privacy inference. A GPT-4-based filtering step removes noisy or improperly categorized samples.

As shown in Fig. 3, the final SecRiskBench contains 650 curated examples, covering **8 high-level risk categories** and **16 subtypes**, providing broad and structured coverage of secondary-risk scenarios. Each subtype contains at least 25 validated examples to ensure statistical reliability in evaluation.

4.2 Data Generation

To reduce the high cost of manual data construction, we adopt a *human-in-the-loop* framework to collaboratively build SecRiskBench, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The pipeline proceeds in three stages:

Instruction generation. We use few-shot prompting with 2–3 seed examples per risk subtype to guide an LLM in generating diverse benign yet plausible user instructions. For example, under

the financial risk category, seeds such as "How do I optimize my investment portfolio?" are used to produce variants that retain benign intent but could trigger risky completions.

Risk response generation. For each generated instruction I_i, we sample multiple candidate risk responses S_i using GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 under varied decoding settings (temperature, top-p). We provide models with detailed behavior guides to simulate diverse covert risk behaviors (e.g., subtle recommendation of unethical actions, guidance that bypasses safety measures without explicit violations).

Filtering and validation. We apply a multi-stage filtering process combining automated heuristics with manual review, described in Sec. 4.3.

4.3 Filtering, Validation, and Quality Assurance

Quality control proceeds through three complementary mechanisms:

Automatic filtering. GPT-4 serves as a meta-evaluator that scores each candidate pair (I_i, S_i) on three criteria: task relevance, implicitness of the risk, and risk-type alignment. Pairs scoring below a threshold are discarded. Subsequently, Sentence-BERT embeddings are used to compute pairwise similarity, and near-duplicate pairs are removed to promote lexical and topical diversity.

Manual review. Three independent annotators reviewed 200 randomly drawn samples to verify (i) that instructions are genuinely benign, (ii) that the risk behavior is valid and categorically correct, and (iii) that the risky content is expressed implicitly. Inter-annotator agreement (Fleiss' $\kappa = 0.81$) confirms strong consistency.

Quantitative quality metrics. The final dataset of 650 pairs satisfies the following quality indicators:

- **Coverage:** 8 high-level categories and 16 subtypes are evenly represented, with ≥ 25 examples per subtype.
- **Lexical diversity:** Mean pairwise Jaccard similarity of instructions is 0.21, indicating low overlap and high expression diversity.
- **Naturalness:** On a 1–5 naturalness scale (GPT-4 evaluated), 84.6% of samples score ≥ 4, confirming that most risky responses are subtle and non-obvious to users.

Table 2: Ablation study on core SecLens components (attack success rate, %). Using both Crossover and Mutation consistently achieves the highest performance across all models and both risk types.

Cross	Mut	GPT-4o	GPT-4-turbo	Claude-3.7	Gemini-2.0-pro	Phi-4	Deepseek-v3	Llama-3.3-70b	Gemma-2-27b	Qwen2.5-32b
Excessive Response										
✓	–	61.9	64.7	52.7	63.8	61.4	67.7	62.4	69.9	65.9
–	✓	62.4	65.1	53.0	64.0	61.8	68.0	62.8	70.4	66.3
✓	✓	**67.5**	**70.3**	**58.4**	**69.4**	**67.1**	**73.2**	**68.1**	**75.8**	**71.7**
Speculative Advice										
✓	–	56.7	54.6	45.3	57.5	55.8	59.0	57.9	61.4	57.3
–	✓	57.0	55.0	44.9	57.8	56.2	59.3	58.3	61.9	57.7
✓	✓	**62.1**	**60.1**	**50.7**	**63.1**	**61.7**	**64.6**	**63.7**	**67.5**	**63.2**

- **Manual validity rate:** Among the 200 manually reviewed samples, 93.5% meet all three criteria, confirming high behavioral fidelity of the benchmark.

Together, these results demonstrate that SecRiskBench provides a structured, diverse, and high-quality foundation for benchmarking secondary risks in LLMs.

5 Experiments

We evaluate SecLens comprehensively across multiple model families and interaction modalities. Sec. 5.1 describes the experimental setup. Sec. 5.2 presents main results on text-only LLMs, including transferability, ablations, and robustness analyses. Sec. 5.3 extends the evaluation to multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Sec. 5.4 examines real-world physical agent environments. Secs. 5.6–5.9 provide further analyses of token-length constraints, additional baseline comparisons, efficiency, and semantic plausibility.

5.1 Experimental Settings

Datasets, metrics and baselines. We use the SecRiskBench dataset (Sec. 4), comprising 650 benign prompts spanning 8 risk categories. To evaluate MLLMs, we additionally pair the collected instructions with corresponding images sourced




Fig. 3: Data categories of SecRiskBench across 8 high-level risk types and 16 subtypes.




Fig. 4: Human-in-the-loop data generation pipeline for SecRiskBench.

from COCO [45] and Stable-Diffusion [46]. For metrics, we adopt attack success rate as the primary measure, supported by three complementary evaluation protocols: (1) *template-based LLM evaluation*, which uses an ensemble of three LLM judges from different model families (GPT-4o, Claude-3.7, and Gemini 2.0-pro) to assess whether the model output both fulfills the task and exhibits harmful secondary-risk behavior, with the mean score as the final rating; (2) *cosine similarity*, which measures the closeness between the model's output and an expected harmful response; and (3) *manual verification*, where human evaluators judge whether the model's output accomplishes the task while introducing harmful behavior. For baselines, we select random sampling, prompt tuning, and MCTS, which are representative search methods. Prompt tuning is applied with simple heuristics to determine the sampling direction, while MCTS follows standard execution procedures [32].

Victim models. We evaluate SecLens on a diverse set of target models spanning both open- and closed-source families. Our open-source text LLMs include Deepseek-v3 [47], Llama-3.3-70b [48], Gemma-2-27b [49], Phi-4 [50], and Qwen2.5-32b [51]; for multimodal settings, we additionally consider Llama-OV-72b [52], Llama-NeXT [53, 54], Qwen2.5-VL [51], Pixtral-12b [55], and MiniCPM-o-2_6 [56]. We further include representative closed-source models, namely GPT-4o [1], GPT-4-turbo [57], Claude-3.7 [27], and Gemini 2.0-pro [28]. For physical interaction experiments, we follow prior work [58, 59] to instantiate both LLM-based and GUI-based (MLLM-based) agent frameworks.

Table 3: Attack success rates (%) of SecLens on LLM-based and MLLM-based agents in real physical environments.

	LLM-based		MLLM-based				
Model	OS	DB	M-rec	M-ret	W-shop	W-post	**Avg**
GPT-4o	47.2 ±0.3	52.5 ±0.3	**48.2** ±0.2	40.9 ±0.3	**56.7** ±0.3	**52.1** ±0.3	49.6 ±0.3
GPT-4-turbo	**49.3** ±0.3	**56.5** ±0.2	**47.8** ±0.4	**53.2** ±0.3	52.7 ±0.3	48.4 ±0.2	**51.3** ±0.3
Claude-3.7	43.2 ±0.3	49.4 ±0.3	45.6 ±0.3	35.8 ±0.3	53.5 ±0.2	**56.5** ±0.3	47.3 ±0.3
Gemini-pro	**56.2** ±0.3	**58.5** ±0.3	43.9 ±0.3	**43.7** ±0.3	**54.9** ±0.2	47.8 ±0.2	**50.8** ±0.3

5.2 Results on Text-Only LLMs

Results on LLMs. Fig. 2 (left) presents the experimental results, where we systematically examine the effectiveness of SecLens in triggering two representative types of secondary risks, namely excessive responses and speculative advice, across a diverse set of popular LLMs. Based on these results, we draw the following observations.

(1) SecLens demonstrates consistently high attack success rates across diverse LLMs, with a maximum success rate of 75.82%. This indicates that secondary risks are widely present across different models and call for greater attention in future research and deployment.

(2) Compared to baselines, our method demonstrates superior performance in both types of risks.




Fig. 5: **(a)** Illustrations of LLM evaluator mistakes, such as misjudging harmful or harmless outputs. **(b)** Examples contrasting "Safe Response" with an "Excessive Response," showing how added instructions can turn otherwise harmless advice unsafe. **(c)** Comparison between a "Safe Response" and "Speculative Advice," showing how unfounded medical claims can lead to harmful guidance.

This advantage stems from our automated framework, which efficiently discovers promising search directions, triggering risks while maintaining task fulfillment and naturalness.

(3) Closed-source models generally demonstrate stronger robustness to secondary risks compared to open-source ones. Models like GPT-4o and Claude-3.7 achieve lower average success rates (67.53% and 58.43%, respectively) than most open-source counterparts. In contrast, open models such as DeepSeek-V3 and Gemma-2-27B reach significantly higher averages (73.23% and 75.82%, respectively), indicating a greater vulnerability to subtle prompt manipulations. Among all evaluated models, Claude-3.7 appears to be the most robust, while Gemma-2-27B is the most susceptible.

(4) Excessive response is easier to trigger than speculative advice. All models exhibit higher success rates for excessive risks. For example, GPT-4o is 67.53% on excessive prompts vs. 62.14% on speculative ones. This indicates that introducing additional risk along the original trajectory is easier than shifting the model toward a different intent.

Manual verification. To eliminate potential biases introduced when using LLMs as evaluators, we employed three independent human annotators for manual verification. As shown in Fig. 2 (left, Manual Evaluation), SecLens consistently outperforms all baselines, achieving improvements of roughly 3–7 percentage points over MCTS and more than 10 percentage points over tuning in the Excessive Response setting, with similarly clear gains in Speculative Advice. We further compare common LLM evaluators with human judgments, as shown in Fig. 2 (bottom-right). Both Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients indicate a high level of agreement, with GPT-4o achieving correlations of up to 99%, confirming the reliability of LLM-based evaluation.

Cross-model transferability. We then study the transferability of secondary risks across different LLM architectures. Specifically, we adopt prompts generated by SecLens on GPT-4o and Claude-3.7 and test their effectiveness against other black-box LLMs, including GPT-4-turbo, Gemini 2.0-pro, Deepseek-v3, Llama-3.3-70b, and Qwen2.5-32b. We report the attack success rates of MCTS and SecLens in Fig. 2 (top-right). Despite architectural differences, the secondary risks induced by SecLens successfully transfer to unseen models, consistently achieving competitive attack success rates compared to MCTS. For instance, prompts optimized on GPT-4o achieve 45.70% and 44.11% success rates when transferred to Llama-3.3-70b and Qwen2.5-32b, respectively. Similarly, prompts from Claude-3.7 reach 42.87% on Qwen2.5-32b and 40.49% on Deepseek-v3. These results indicate that LLMs possess universal and intrinsic vulnerabilities when confronted with secondary risks.

Representative examples. We select several representative examples to illustrate both failure

Table 4: Attack success rates (%) of SecLens and baselines on MLLMs for two types of secondary risks. SecLens consistently outperforms all baselines across both risk categories.

Model	Excessive Response				Speculative Advice			
	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours
GPT-4o	16.57	42.31	52.10	**57.34**	14.84	40.47	49.72	**52.14**
GPT-4-turbo	17.85	43.15	53.87	**58.13**	15.47	35.32	46.56	**50.78**
Claude-3.7	12.54	40.12	48.34	**52.10**	8.32	34.32	41.35	**46.54**
Gemini 2.0-pro	16.48	50.12	54.57	**60.41**	13.38	47.82	55.16	**58.20**
Llama-OV-72b	18.79	51.14	56.34	**60.26**	15.98	48.45	53.31	**57.25**
Llama-NeXT	19.84	52.40	56.31	**63.29**	16.48	51.25	56.67	**60.45**
Qwen2.5-VL	18.49	50.54	56.30	**60.70**	17.26	44.46	52.13	**55.45**
Pixtral-12b	21.47	54.67	59.78	**64.31**	20.56	52.89	57.27	**63.19**
MiniCPM-o-2_6	18.24	49.83	57.56	**59.41**	15.29	50.64	53.72	**58.21**

cases of the LLM-based evaluator and demonstrations of two risk types with their safe counterparts, as shown in Fig. 5. In (a), the LLM evaluator incorrectly labels responses despite clear safety signals: one model reply suggests "deleting the Windows folder," a highly destructive action, yet receives a partially positive judgment, while a harmless file-organization suggestion is mistakenly flagged as unsafe. Although these are relatively rare cases, they illustrate how evaluators can occasionally be influenced by superficial cues and fail to separate high-risk technical actions from harmless advice. (b) and (c) highlight two distinct risk types, namely Excessive Response and Speculative Advice, by presenting safe and harmful outputs side by side, which illustrates how small changes in a model's reply can shift it from acceptable to unsafe.

Additional experimental analyses. Beyond core results, Fig. 6 provides complementary evidence on the robustness and interpretability of secondary risk induction. Fig. 6(a) reports inter-annotator agreement across annotation dimensions, confirming that secondary risks can be identified with consistent judgment. Fig. 6(b) examines the sensitivity of optimization to multi-objective weight variations, showing that secondary risk induction degrades gracefully rather than collapsing under more conservative task or naturalness constraints. Fig. 6(c) compares different multi-objective formulations under identical query budgets, demonstrating that Pareto- and constraint-based strategies achieve competitive trade-offs relative to weighted-sum aggregation. Finally, Fig. 6(d) analyzes the effect of output length on excessive responses, indicating that secondary risks persist under both short and long generation budgets, and not merely as a byproduct of increased verbosity.

Table 5: Attack success rates (%) measured by cosine similarity (≥80% threshold) against target behaviors in MLLMs.

Model	Excessive response				Speculative Advice			
	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours
GPT-4o	13.94	38.82	48.67	**53.42**	11.57	36.23	45.89	**48.61**
GPT-4-turbo	14.67	39.41	49.12	**53.38**	11.75	31.68	42.03	**45.91**
Claude-3.7	9.86	35.46	44.79	**48.64**	5.39	30.18	37.65	**42.14**

5.3 Results on Multimodal LLMs

To investigate whether secondary risks generalize beyond text-only settings, we extend the evaluation to multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). We pair each textual prompt with a relevant image to form multimodal inputs. Image selection and validation proceed in two stages: (1) CLIP-based text-image matching against COCO, retaining only pairs with cosine similarity $\geq$ 85%; and (2) manual verification to remove any images that fail to meet content standards. For instructions without a suitable COCO match, images are generated via Stable Diffusion.

Main MLLM results. Table 4 presents attack success rates across nine MLLMs under our method and three baselines. SecLens consistently achieves the highest success rates across all models and both risk types. Compared to the text-only setting, success rates drop slightly—likely due to shifts in model behavior introduced by image-text alignment. Nevertheless, the absolute rates remain substantial: for example, Pixtral-12b achieves 64.31% on Excessive Response and 63.19% on Speculative Advice, while Llama-NeXT reaches 63.29% and 60.45%, respectively. These results highlight the generalizability of SecLens across modalities and further confirm that secondary risks are pervasive in vision-language models.

Evaluation via cosine similarity. Table 5 reports attack success rates computed using cosine similarity between model outputs and predefined target behaviors, with an 80% threshold. Our method consistently achieves the highest success rates across all models and both risk types, outperforming Random, Tuning, and MCTS baselines, confirming that SecLens elicits responses that are not only dangerous but also semantically close to the intended harmful behavior.

Manual verification on MLLMs. Table 6 reports human-verified attack success rates. Our method achieves the highest success rates across all model settings, closely matching trends observed in




Fig. 6: **(a)** Inter-Annotator Agreement (IAA) for secondary risk annotation. **(b)** Effect of multi-objective weight variations on optimization. **(c)** Comparison of multi-objective formulations under identical budgets. **(d)** Token length impact on excessive response.

Table 6: Attack success rates (%) on MLLMs determined via human manual verification.

Model	Excessive response				Speculative Advice			
	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours
GPT-4o	13.72	38.91	47.84	**52.89**	11.93	36.74	44.97	**48.20**
GPT-4-turbo	14.55	39.65	49.12	**53.37**	12.03	31.84	41.91	**45.62**
Claude-3.7	9.83	35.27	44.31	**47.85**	5.92	30.11	37.06	**41.72**

cosine-based evaluation. This consistency—across both automated and human judgment—further supports our main conclusion: secondary risks are widespread across modern MLLMs, and SecLens is effective in uncovering them.

5.4 Results in Physical Interaction Environments

In this section, we conduct experiments in two types of physical interaction environments: LLM-based agents and MLLM-based agents. For the LLM-based agent, we assess SecLens in Operating System (*OS*) and Database (*DB*) tasks [58, 59], evaluating its effectiveness in eliciting secondary risks during critical system interactions. For the MLLM-based agent, we evaluate in Mobile [58] and Website [59] environments. In the Mobile environment, we test the agent in two tasks: *M-recording* (logging content in Notes) and *M-retrieval* (browsing and retrieving information). In the Website environment, we evaluate two scenarios: *W-shopping* (purchasing items on Amazon) and *W-posting* (posting messages on Twitter). The mobile device used for experiments is a Xiaomi Redmi Note 13 Pro.


As shown in Table 3, SecLens maintains impressive performance in physical interaction environments, attributed to its strong black-box design. The results demonstrate that secondary risks are not confined to LLM question-answering settings but are also prevalent across common agent-interaction tasks. GPT-4-turbo achieves an average success rate of 51.32%, with individual performances of 56.46% in the DB scenario and 53.17% in M-retrieval. Similarly, Gemini 2.0-pro achieves 50.83% on average, with notable results of 56.19% on OS and 58.51% on DB.

As illustrated in Fig. 7, representative successful attack cases reveal that these risks carry multifaceted consequences: they can threaten users' reputations and privacy (Figs. 7(b) and (c)), or lead to unnecessary economic losses (Figs. 7(a) and (d)). These examples confirm that secondary risks are pervasive and context-dependent, affecting both personal and financial dimensions of human-AI interaction, and underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms targeting this class of failures.

5.5 Ablation Studies

Ablation on SecLens components. We ablate SecLens's two core evolutionary operators, *Crossover* and *Mutation*, by comparing the full method with variants that enable only one operator. As shown in Table 2, the full SecLens consistently achieves the highest attack success rates across all evaluated models and both risk types. In contrast, using only Crossover or only Mutation leads to a consistent drop of roughly 5–6 percentage points. This indicates that the two operators play complementary roles: Crossover expands search-space diversity and explores new semantic directions, while Mutation further refines local neighborhoods to improve risk activation under task and naturalness constraints. The combination of both is essential for achieving the best trade-off between exploration and exploitation.

Ablation on few-shot contextual guidance. We design 0-shot, 1-shot, 2-shot, and 3-shot



(a) Excessive response in a web payment process

(b) Speculative advice in a web-based social media post

(c) Excessive response in a mobile application

(d) Speculative advice in a mobile application

Fig. 7: **(a)** The user requests the web agent to find Apple AirPods, and it unexpectedly places an order on Amazon without their confirmation. **(b)** The user inquires how to become famous in the community, and the web agent posts a misleading statement on social media. **(c)** The user instructs the mobile agent to record their doctor's appointment, and it logs medication history. **(d)** The user queries the mobile agent how to make a million dollars quickly, and it attempts to borrow money from wealthy individuals on social media.

Table 7: Convergence trajectories under different few-shot contextual guidance settings (fitness score vs. generation).

Shot	0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40
0-shot	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	6.5	7.0
1-shot	0.8	3.0	4.2	5.0	7.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	9.0
2-shot	1.8	5.0	5.5	6.0	7.0	8.5	9.0	8.8	9.0
3-shot	2.0	6.0	6.5	7.0	8.0	9.0	9.5	9.7	10.0

settings to study how few-shot guidance affects convergence. As illustrated in Table 7, adding contextual examples substantially accelerates convergence: the 3-shot setting reaches fitness score 10.0 at generation 35, compared to only 7.0 for the 0-shot baseline, corresponding to approximately 2–3× faster convergence. These results confirm that few-shot guidance effectively steers the initial search direction and significantly improves optimization efficiency.

5.6 Evaluation under Token-Length Constraints

To distinguish Excessive Response from the verbosity preference commonly induced by RLHF, we conduct experiments with a strict maximum generation length of 128 tokens (Table 8). Unlike RLHF-induced verbosity—where longer outputs correlate with higher reward—Excessive Response concerns whether models produce risk-amplifying content regardless of length constraints. Even under this tight restriction, models remain highly vulnerable: across GPT-4o, Claude-3.7, Gemini 2.0-pro, Llama-3.3-70b, and Qwen2.5-32b, SecLens consistently

Table 8: Attack success rates (%) under a strict token-length constraint (max_token = 128), demonstrating that Excessive Response persists independently of output length.

Model	**Excessive Response**			
	Random	Tuning	MCTS	Ours
GPT-4o	17.42±0.21	58.09±0.44	66.48±0.39	**68.74**±0.31
GPT-4-turbo	20.61±0.29	62.11±0.23	64.74±0.41	**71.52**±0.28
Claude-3.7	12.67±0.20	51.44±0.39	54.13±0.28	**59.71**±0.37
Gemini 2.0-pro	19.74±0.30	59.73±0.36	66.42±0.44	**70.55**±0.35
Phi-4	21.54±0.26	56.22±0.35	66.91±0.32	**65.48**±0.31
Deepseek-v3	21.11±0.38	61.05±0.45	69.22±0.41	**72.09**±0.39
Llama-3.3-70b	22.07±0.23	59.68±0.34	62.14±0.37	**69.41**±0.40
Gemma-2-27b	24.82±0.32	64.51±0.33	68.11±0.39	**74.64**±0.40
Qwen2.5-32b	23.32±0.30	60.75±0.33	66.31±0.42	**72.84**±0.29

achieves the highest attack success rates, typically reaching 65–75%. This confirms that Excessive Response is a distinct and fundamental safety risk, clearly separable from length-driven verbosity, and warrants independent investigation as a dedicated evaluation dimension.

5.7 Comparison with Additional Baselines

To further validate SecLens against state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, we compare against AutoBreach [8] and PIF [60], both of which are strong black-box prompt-search baselines directly applicable to our setting. As shown in Table 9, SecLens consistently outperforms these strong baselines across a wide range of models. Notably, our approach achieves the highest attack success rates in nearly all cases. This advantage stems from

Table 9: Comparison with additional state-of-the-art baselines (attack success rates, %, Excessive Response setting). SecLens outperforms both specialized jailbreak methods across all models.

Model	Excessive Response		
	AutoBreach	PIF	Ours
GPT-4o	64.12±0.40	66.48±0.39	**68.74**±0.31
GPT-4-turbo	62.90±0.28	64.74±0.41	**71.52**±0.28
Claude-3.7	53.75±0.37	54.13±0.28	**59.71**±0.37
Gemini 2.0-pro	62.05±0.34	66.42±0.44	**70.55**±0.35
Phi-4	63.88±0.33	66.91±0.32	**65.48**±0.31
Deepseek-v3	67.84±0.41	69.22±0.41	**72.09**±0.39
Llama-3.3-70b	60.95±0.36	62.14±0.37	**69.41**±0.40
Gemma-2-27b	66.72±0.35	68.11±0.39	**74.64**±0.40
Qwen2.5-32b	63.27±0.32	66.31±0.42	**72.84**±0.29

Table 10: Prompt evolution during semantic-guided optimization. Fitness score $F(x)$ increases across iterations as the prompt subtly shifts toward secondary-risk-inducing regions while preserving semantic plausibility.

Prompt (x)	LLM Response	F(x)
x_0: *Check passport expiration.*	Your passport expires in March 2026. Let me know if you need help with anything else.	1.2
x_1: *When does my passport expire and should I renew it now?*	Your passport is set to expire in March 2026. Renewal is usually advised at least 6 months in advance.	2.8
x_2: *Should I be concerned if my passport is expiring soon?*	If your passport is expiring in March 2026, now is a good time to renew it. Do you want me to pull up your last renewal history?	4.5
...	...	...
x_t: *My passport is expiring in March. How early do I need to schedule an appointment for renewal?*	You should schedule your renewal at least 3–6 months in advance. **Since you're based in Singapore**, earlier slots tend to fill up quickly at the ICA building.	10.0

SecLens's population-based multi-objective optimization, which more effectively balances risk activation, task compliance, and naturalness—whereas jailbreak-focused baselines lack explicit naturalness constraints and are not designed for non-adversarial secondary risk settings.

5.8 Efficiency and Query Complexity

Although SecLens and MCTS share the same worst-case asymptotic query complexity $O(B)$—both are bounded by the same generation budget B—SecLens converges substantially faster in practice, as shown in Table 11. SecLens requires on average only 34.6 model queries per prompt compared to 52.8 for MCTS, and consumes 15.9k tokens per prompt versus 24.9k, representing reductions of approximately 35% and 36%, respectively. This efficiency gain stems from SecLens's population-based evolutionary design, which evaluates a diverse set of candidate prompts in parallel, combined with few-shot guided initialization and multi-objective fitness formulation. These components enable SecLens to extract more informative signal from each query batch and avoid the inefficient, path-wise exploration characteristic of MCTS. Consequently, SecLens achieves successful secondary-risk discovery with significantly lower query and token costs, making it practical for large-scale evaluation.

Table 11: Comparison of time complexity and empirical efficiency between SecLens and MCTS. Both share the same asymptotic complexity, but SecLens requires far fewer queries and tokens in practice.

Method	Time Complexity	Avg. queries / prompt	Avg. tokens / prompt
MCTS	$O(B)$	52.8	24.9k
SecLens	$O(B)$	**34.6**	**15.9k**

Table 12: Semantic similarity between SecLens-optimized prompts and their original benign counterparts, measured by CLIP and Sentence-BERT (SBERT), together with human agreement rates.

Model	CLIP Similarity	SBERT Similarity	Human Agreement (%)
GPT-4o	0.94	0.91	93.2
GPT-4-turbo	0.93	0.90	92.5
Claude-3.7	0.95	0.92	94.1
Gemini-2.0-pro	0.92	0.89	91.4
Phi-4	0.94	0.90	92.0
Deepseek-v3	0.93	0.91	93.7
Llama-3.3-70b	0.92	0.88	90.8
Gemma-2-27b	0.95	0.93	94.3
Qwen2.5-32b	0.93	0.90	92.1

5.9 Semantic Plausibility of Elicited Prompts

A key property of secondary-risk elicitation is that the optimized prompts must remain semantically faithful to the original benign instructions, ensuring that the induced risks are genuinely non-adversarial. We measure similarity between optimized prompts and their original benign counterparts using both CLIP and Sentence-BERT (SBERT) embeddings.

As shown in Table 12, optimized prompts maintain consistently high similarity scores across all evaluated models, with CLIP similarities above 0.92 and SBERT similarities above 0.88. Human evaluators report over 90% agreement that the optimized prompts remain semantically faithful.

These results confirm that SecLens preserves the appearance and semantic structure of benign task instructions, ensuring that the discovered risks genuinely arise from the benign interaction setting rather than from adversarial distortion.

Table 10 presents a representative sequence of prompts produced throughout the semantic-guided optimization process. As the iterations progress, prompts gradually shift toward behaviors associated with secondary risks—such as inferring private attributes—while maintaining strong semantic consistency with the original benign task. This progression illustrates how SecLens strategically explores risk-inducing regions of the prompt space without visibly deviating from benign user intent.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we introduce secondary risks as a novel class of non-adversarial LLM failures that arise during benign user interactions and often evade standard safety mechanisms. We provide a mechanistic account showing that such behaviors occur with non-zero probability under post-training objectives, and distill them into two primitives: excessive response and speculative advice. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce SecRiskBench, a structured benchmark of 650 curated instruction-risk pairs spanning 8 risk categories and 16 subtypes, built with rigorous quality control. Building on this foundation, we propose SecLens, a black-box search framework that jointly optimizes task relevance, risk activation, and linguistic plausibility, and evaluate it comprehensively across 16 popular models, including text-only LLMs, multimodal systems, and GUI-based agents in real physical environments. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that secondary risks are pervasive, transferable across model families, robust to token-length constraints, and largely modality-independent. SecLens also achieves superior efficiency over competitive baselines, requiring approximately 35% fewer queries per prompt. These findings collectively underscore the urgent need for more robust alignment mechanisms that explicitly account for secondary-risk patterns, and we hope this work establishes a foundation for future research into trustworthy, intent-aligned LLMs capable of safe deployment under naturalistic, non-adversarial conditions.

Acknowledgments

This work is supported by the Project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China No. 62472177.

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